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INTRODUCTION
Corporate income is currently taxed twice-first to the cor-
poration when earned and a second time to the shareholder when
distributed as dividends.1 This "double taxation" is a much reviled,
but stubbornly persistent feature of our current system.2 Few, if
any, commentators suggest that we would consciously adopt it if we
were working from a blank slate,' and most openly recommend
double taxation's demise.' Even the nineteenth-century movement
to personify the corporation as a separate entity, which is often
considered the foundation for the separate corporate income tax
and, by implication, double taxation,5 was followed by an income tax
act carefully crafted to avoid imposing a second layer of tax on
1. I.R.C. § 11 (2000) (imposing a tax on corporate income); id. §§ 301, 316 (imposing a
shareholder-level tax on distributions in the form of dividends). This is sometimes referred
to as the "classical" system because it still treats the corporation and shareholder as separate
taxpayers rather than integrating the corporate and shareholder-level taxes. See Michael J.
Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An
Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1768 (1999). As Graetz and Warren point out, the classical
system does not always result in double taxation. For example, corporate income is not taxed
twice when a shareholder is exempt from tax or when corporate income is paid out as
deductible interest payments. In fact, it is not even taxed once when it is paid out as
deductible interest to a foreign or other tax-exempt holder of corporate debt. Id. at 1768.
2. See, e.g., CHARLES E. MCLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwiCE? 2-3
(1979); Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes,
94 HARV. L. REV. 719, 720 (1981).
3. For one of the few defenses of double taxation, see Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain
Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 68 N.C. L. REv. 613 (1990) (arguing
that double taxation protects the progressivity of the income tax).
4. See AMERICAN LAW INSITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT- INTEGRATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES - REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAx
INTEGRATION (1993); U.S. DEP T OF TREAStmY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); Joseph M. Dodge, A
Combined Mark.to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal,
50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995); John K McNulty, Corporate Income Tax Reform in the United
States: Proposals for Integration of the Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, and
International Aspects, 12 INTL TAX & Bus. L. 161 (1994); George K. Yin, Corporate Tax
Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 TAX L. REV. 431 (1992).
5. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, TAXATION OF
PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERUISES: REPOltTER'S STUDY 35-36 (1999); Maijorie E. Kornhauser,
Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53,136 (1990);
cf. RICHARD GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 24-25 (1951) ("In the legal sense, of
course, the corporate and individual income taxes do not result in double taxation. The
corporation and its stockholders are different legal persons and have separate incomes.*).
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corporate income.6 Not until 1936 was corporate income fully subject
to two layers of tax. Double taxation's origins, therefore, have
remained a mystery for modem observers.
This Article seeks to resolve this mystery by examining the
circumstances leading to the imposition of the full double tax in
1936. Although the corporate-level tax traces its roots to the
nineteenth century,7 and the corporate and shareholder-level taxes
have coexisted since the first post-Sixteenth Amendment revenue
act was adopted in 1913," double taxation was at least partially or
fully alleviated during the early years of the income tax. In the
Revenue Act of 1936,' however, President Roosevelt introduced a
radical plan to combat corporate "hoarding" of earnings by replacing
the corporate income tax with an undistributed profits tax and a
repeal of the exemption for dividends from the "normal" individual
income tax.' If distributed as dividends, corporate income would
only be subject to the individual income tax. 1 If retained, however,
corporate income would be subject to a punitive undistributed
profits tax and, upon distribution in later years, the individual
income tax as well.' Managers bitterly fought the proposal,
claiming that its coercive undistributed profits tax constituted a
dangerous and unwarranted governmental interference with the
operation of their businesses." As part of an ill-fated compromise,
Congress retained the corporate income tax, along with a more
6. See Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 28,28 Stat. 509,554. For a more complete description
of the circumstances giving rise to the adoption of the first separate corporate income tax, and
a refutation of the traditional view that the separate corporate income tax arose because of
developments in entity theory, see Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of
the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 462 (2001).
7. See Bank, supra note 6, at 462.
8. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
9. Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648.
10. At the time, all individual income was subject to a *normal,* or base flat rate tax.
When income reached a certain point, an additional surtax was applied at rogressive rates.
Dividends were exempt from the normal tax, but not the surtax rates. See infra text
accompanying notes 58-73.
11. See Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648.
12. See id.
13. Corporations had been subject to an accumulated earnings tax since the first post-
Sixteenth Amendment income tax in 1913, but it only applied in the event that a corporation
retained income with the purpose of evading the high surtax rates. This intent requirement
was difficult to prove. Under Roosevelt's proposal, by contrast, the undistributed profits tax
applied regardless of the purpose for the retention. See infra text accompanying notes 170-7 1.
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modest undistributed profits tax, but no effort was made to restore
the dividend exemption.14 Thus, for the first time corporate earnings
were fully subject to both the corporate and individual income taxes.
This tax on dividends survived the repeal of the undistributed
profits tax a few years later.'5
As several modern commentators have noted,16 managers'
vigorous opposition to the undistributed profits tax partly reflected
the problem of agency costs, or the costs flowing from the delegation
of authority to an agent-the manager-who is imbued with self-
interest. " In this imperfect agency relationship, shareholders must
monitor manager behavior to guard against projects that will result
in an increase in manager compensation and prestige without a
corresponding benefit to shareholders. 8 In large, publicly-traded
corporations, however, existing shareholders tend to be much less
vigilant than lenders and potential investors in this task.'9
Recognizing this, managers often seek to avoid the capital markets
by financing their new ventures through "free cash flow," or internal
cash flow in excess of that needed to fund existing operations and
projects.20 During the New Deal, various legal and extra-legal norms
14. § 25, 49 Stat. at 1661-62.
15. See infra Part II.C.4.
16. See, e.g., William G. Christie & Vikram Nanda, Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value,
and the UndistributedProftts Taxof1936 and 1937, 49J. FIN. 1727,1728 (1994); MarkJ. Roe,
Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1496-
99 (1991). But see CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & R. GLENN HiMBARD, INTERNAL FINANCE AND
INVESTMENI. EVIDENCE FROM THE UNDISTREBUTED PROFrrS TAX OF 1936-1937, at 12-13 (Natl
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4288, 1993) (concluding that the difference in
costs of external financing reflected capital market problems rather than the excesses of
entrenched managers).
17. For a general discussion of the agency cost problem in the economics and finance
literature, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 650 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323 (1986); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
18. See Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An
Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 11, 11-12 (1985); James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax
Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 698-99
(1997).
19. See Easterbrook, supra note 17, at 654 ("New investors are better than old ones at
chiseling down agency costs.").
20. See Christie & Nanda, supra note 16, at 1728-29 (finding that firm value increased
2002]
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of corporate behavior supported this form of financing both by
affording managers virtually unlimited discretion on the decision to
issue dividends and by considering the retention of between 30 and
50% of corporate profits to be good business practice.21 The
undistributed profits tax, by penalizing the retention of earnings,
posed a substantial threat to managers' ability to rely on internal
financing.22
This Article concludes that the threat posed to managers by the
undistributed profits tax led to the retention of the corporate income
tax and the repeal of the dividend exemption. Far from being a
typical New Deal assault on big business or an inadvertent by-
product of the compromise over Roosevelt's original proposal,23
double taxation was a pro-manager measure adopted to blunt the
force of the undistributed profits tax. Business leaders and their
allies in Congress hoped that the repeal of the dividend exemption
and the resulting imposition of double taxation would aid in
aligning management-shareholder attitudes toward the retention of
corporate earnings. Shareholders were willing to allow corporate
managers to retain earnings so long as the high surtax rates on
distributed income exceeded the corporate-level tax on retained
income. At high rates, however, the undistributed profits tax would
reverse shareholder incentives and cause shareholders to demand
distributions. Opponents sought to counter such incentives by
subjecting dividends to a tax rate equal to or higher than that on
undistributed profits. These critics believed this would circumvent
the pro-distribution policy of the undistributed profits tax and
leave managers free to retain earnings for alternative uses.
Double taxation thus became a tool in the campaign against the
undistributed profits tax.
after the announcement of the undistributed profits tax where the potential to abuse free cash
flow was the greatest); Jensen, supra note 17, at 323 (defining "free cash flow").
21. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
22. See Roe, supra note 16, at 1496-97 (suggesting that manager dissatisfaction with the
undistributed profits tax was due to the threat it posed to managers' ability to use retained
earnings).
23. See Kwall, supra note 3, at 619-20 (suggesting that double taxation was the
inadvertent result of the Senate's decision to retain the corporate income tax to go along with
the undistributed profits tax proposal); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a
Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1097-98 (2000) (same).
172 [Vol. 44:167
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Double taxation's political origins demonstrate that the
disincentive to distribute corporate earnings as dividends is not
merely a by-product of the tax on dividends, but was indeed the
underlying impetus for the provision. While others have attributed
the persistence of double taxation to the problem of agency costs,
24
this Article is the first to suggest that double taxation actually
arose as a political resolution to the problem of divergent
manager/shareholder views toward dividend payout policies. Part
I briefly describes the origins of the separate corporate income tax
and its development immediately after the ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment. The absence of double taxation, or of any
conscious attempt to design a system of double taxation, during this
period is particularly emphasized. Part II outlines the economic and
legal circumstances leading to Roosevelt's call for an undistributed
profits tax. Part III explores the concerted campaigns by corporate
management in 1936 and 1938 to defeat Roosevelt's proposal and,
when this proved too difficult, to minimize its disruptive force
through the use of the dividend tax. Part IV concludes by exploring
the possible reasons why double taxation continued beyond the
expiration of the undistributed profits tax.
I. THE ORIGINS OF A SEPARATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX
A. Civil War and Reconstruction
During this country's earliest experience with an income tax,2
corporations were not directly taxed on account of their corporate
24. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate
Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 336 (1995); John K McNulty, Reform of the Individual Income
Tax by Integration of the Corporate Income Tax, 46 TAX NOTs 1445, 1446 (1990); James R.
Repetti, Corporate Governance and Stockholder Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy
Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 1034-35 (1992); Repetti, supra note 18, at 716; Herwig
J. Schlunk, The Zen of Corporate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 MICH. L. REV. 410,411 n.8
(2000); Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, The Proper Way to Eliminate the
Corporate Tax, 27 TAx NOTS 637, 638-39 (1985); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax
Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 173 (1997).
25. Although there was some antebellum experimentation with income-like taxes at the
state and local level, a federal income tax was first employed in 1861 at the onset of the Civil
War and remained a source of revenue until it was allowed to expire in 1872 at the end of
Reconstruction. See Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 329, 340-60
(1996).
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status. Nevertheless, the seeds of a corporate income tax were
planted during the Civil War and Reconstruction.28 Individuals, in
these early revenue acts, were taxed on the dividends received from
corporations as well as the undistributed profits of corporations or
partnerships in which an individual held an ownership interest.27
When shareholders mounted a judicial challenge to the attempt to
tax them on the undivided profits of a corporation, the Court upheld
this conduit form of income taxation in Collector v. Hubbard.'
The focus on individual income does not mean that corporations
were not subject to taxation under the new revenue measure. The
1864 Act taxed businesses in certain specified industries such as
transportation, insurance, and banking on dividends or interest
paid, and "undistributed sums, or sums made or added during the
year to their surplus or contingent funds. 2 9 These taxes were
technically based on the type of business, rather than the form of
organization, but it was no accident that the corporate form of doing
business dominated the selected industries.' The measure appeared
to parallel efforts at the state and local levels to prevent erosion
26. This section is but a brief description of the origins of a separate tax on corporations.
For a more complete discussion of the early development of corporate income taxation, see
Bank, supra note 6.
27. See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 282 ("Mhe gains and profits of
all companies, whether incorporated or partnership, other than the companies specified in
this section, shall be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person
entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.").
28. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870).
29. §§ 120-22, 13 Stat. at 283-85. The taxes on dividends and interest paid were generally
regarded as withholding taxes. See Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, Q. J. ECON. 416,
427 (1894). However, the tax on undistributed sums or sums added to surplus was effectively
an entity-level tax on corporate earnings.
30. See JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEw JERSEY: BUSINESS AND PoLITIcs
1791-1875, at 389 (1945). According to Cadman:
[Tjhere were certain types of business corporations that were singled out during
the first half of the nineteenth century for special treatment in the matter of
taxation. The principal representatives of the groups to which special rules of
taxation were applied were commercial banks, insurance companies, canal and
railroad corporations, and a few early telegraph companies.
Id.; see also FRANK I. HERRIOTr, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF CORPORATION TAXES
IN IOWA 4a (1902) ("One class of corporations would receive attention and then another. One
method of assessment would be taken with one class and another basis with another class.");
JAMEs WLLARD HURST, THE LEGTIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 17 (1970).
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of the property tax base by targeting industries with a high con-
centration of corporations. 1
Although these two taxes-the individual dividends/undivided
profits tax and the industry-specific dividends/undistributed profits
tax--overlapped considerably, Congress did not intend to use them
to impose a double tax burden. As one Representative said on a
related provision, "I do not think that the Government should derive
double taxation from the same property for the same period of time.
That is a proposition, the correctness of which I think every member
will concede." 2 To avoid this result with respect to business
earnings, taxable businesses were permitted to deduct amounts
previously taxed, such as undistributed sums, from the tax due on
the payment of a dividend; investors were permitted to exclude
dividends and interest received from taxable businesses.33 This only
achieved partial integration at best, however, because the business
dividends tax was imposed at a flat rate while the individual income
tax was imposed at graduated rates that sometimes exceeded the
flat rate.34 Nevertheless, this omission is more likely the result of
31. See FREDERIC C. HOWE, TAXATION AND TAXES Di THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE
INTERNAL REvENuE SYSTEM 1791-1895, at 103 (1896) (noting that the Civil War "legislation
but followed the approved practices of the States in selecting such a method of reaching this
form ofproperty); see also EDWIN R.A. SELiGmAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 143 (1895) [hereinafter
SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION) (noting the development at the state level to combat the
erosion of the property tax). The property tax's decline in effectiveness was primarily
attributed to the expansive operations, widely dispersed stock ownership, and vast intangible
wealth associated with certain classes of corporations. See Henry C. Adams, Suggestions for
a System of Taxation, PUBLICATIONS OF THE MICK. POL. Sci. ASS'N 65 (1894) ("The inadequacy,
under existing economic conditions, of the general property tax, so called, and its utter failure,
even under the most rigorous and effective administrative methods that have been devised,
to reach for taxation property of a corporate and intangible character are recognized in all the
States [studied)."); Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Taxation of Corporations 1, 5 POL. So. Q. 269,
269 (1890) [hereinafter Seligman, The Taxation of Corporations 11 ("In all ages and in all
countries it has been found almost impossible to reach intangible personalty. What has
always been a difficult task has become immensely complicated to-day through the growth of
the corporation.*).
32. CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1534 (1862) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (offering
an amendment to a proposed inheritance tax that would relieve all property taxed during life
from taxation at death).
33. §§ 117, 121, 13 Stat. 223, at 281, 284.
34. As originally introduced by the House Ways and Means Committee, the income tax
portion of the 1864 Act proposed a flat 5% tax on all income, including dividends and interest.
Graduated rates were later added to the individual income tax sections during the debates
in Congress, but no similar change was made to the taxation of the specified businesses on
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administrative difficulties than a decision to subject business
income to double taxation.35
B. State Law Developments in the Taxation of Corporations
The federal experiment with income taxation was allowed to
expire at the end of Radical Reconstruction, but states continued to
focus on the corporation in their effort to raise revenues. The
industry-specific method of targeting corporations broke down,
however, as corporations became the predominant form of doing
business in nearly every industry. 6 Thus, states increasingly shifted
their focus from taxing industries to taxing corporations. 7 Industry-
specific taxes were not eliminated; instead, they were supplemented
with a general system of corporate taxation intended to more fairly
allocate the burden of taxation among the corporations.3 The
their dividends and interest. See EDwiN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INcoME TAX 440-41 (1911)
[hereinafter SEUGMAN, THE INCOME TAX].
35. Id. at 444 (The graduated principle of the income tax could, however, obviously not
be applied to the dividends and interest tax, and it was for this reason that the proportional
rate of five per cent was imposed."); HAROLD Q. LANGENDEzRR, 2 THE FEDERAL INCOME TA,
1861-1872, at 475 (1980). Discussing the same provision under the 1865 Act, Langenderfer
concluded:
Dividends, salaries, and interest were subject to a straight five per cent
withholding tax on all amounts above $600. In other words, the progressive
feature did not apply to these sources of income even though Congress had had
several years experience with the tax. The apparent reason seems to have been
the problem of administration.
Id.
36. See Adams, supra note 31, at 65 (statement of Mr. Cutcheon as part of the discussion
after delivery of Adams' main paper).
37. As noted by one historian:
By 1903 ... seventeen of the twenty states of the iron rectangle reached the
capital stock of corporations under provisions of the general property tax as
specially administered for certain classes of corporations. Under special
definitions of personal property, moreover, eight of the twenty states, including
New York, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois, levied taxation on corporate
franchises. But the most impressive shift away from the policies of the preceding
generation could be traced in the fact that seventeen states of the Northern tier
had inaugurated extensive systems of distinct corporate taxation, some general,
some special.
C.I YEARLEY, THE MONEY MACHINES: THE BREAWOwN AND REFORM OF GOVERNMENTAL AND
PARTY FINANCE IN THE NORTH, 1860-1920, at 207 (1970).
38. In 1869, for example, New Jersey's Governor used his inaugural address to call for the
adoption of a tax "based on the 'profits or dividends' of all the corporations chartered" by the
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corporate tax became not merely a Band-Aid to cover the gaps in the
traditional property tax's reach, but a separate form of taxation
altogether.
Paralleling the advent of the general corporation tax was a
growing recognition of the failings of property-based systems of
corporation taxation, such as the capital stock tax. The problem was
that a corporation's capital stock was not reliably correlated with its
ability to pay. Where the tax was based on the amount of capital
stock outstanding at the time of incorporation, corporations easily
could reduce their burden by deliberately establishing a low
capitalization.39 Moreover, capital stock only measured equity,
rather than debt, contributions to the corporation. As Edwin
Seligman pointed out, "heavily bonded corporations, would ...
entirely escape taxation; because in such cases-and they are the
great majority-the capital stock alone would not represent the
value of the property."' Because of such problems, in effect, the
corporate income tax arose at the state level as a substitute for
an individual property tax on corporate investments. 1 States
increasingly resorted to corporation taxes based upon earnings, the
state. CADMAN, supra note 30, at 409-10. According to the Governor, only a few corporations,
and some of them neither rich nor profitable, contributed all of the expenses of the state. See
Editorial, Taxes on Corporations, NEwARK DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 18, 1870, at 1. The New
Jersey corporate tax was designed 'to include all, or at least many more corporations in the
operation of the law, thus increasing the sources of revenue and equalizing the burdens." Id.
New Jersey's general corporate tax subsequently died for lack of enforcement, but it was
revived in the 1880s at about the time that other states, such as New York and Iowa, were
adopting or considering the adoption of similar general corporate taxes. CADMAN, supra note
30, at 414-16; HxaRIOTr, supra note 30, at 24; Seligman, The Taxation of Corporations I,
supra note 31, at 301-02.
39. In one typical example, an Indiana railroad whose stock was worth at least $3 million
set its capital stock at a mere $50,000 because state law imposed a tax based on a percentage
of the capital stock at the time of incorporation. See JACOB P. DuNN, THE NEW TAX LAW OF
INDIANAAND THE SCIENCE OF TAXATION 51 (1892). As a local commentator noted in discussing
the situation, "The law as framed admits of evasions ... but how can such a result be avoided
under the law? You can not compel a corporation to have a certain amount of capital stock."
Id.
40. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION, supra note 31, at 193.
41. As one contemporary commentator explained, since it is "impossible to secure payment
from [stocks, bonds, shares, and other forms of personal property] by tracing it to individual
proprietors, the tax is levied upon the corporation, which from its nature must have a legal
situs and maintain a current record of its property and earnings." Adams, supra note 31, at
441.42.
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amount of business transacted, dividends, and profits or income."2
The trend was away from the taxation of corporate property and
toward the taxation of corporate income.
C. Federal Adoption of a Separate Corporate Income Tax
The increasing state reliance on general, rather than industry-
based, corporate income taxes during the latter half of the
nineteenth century served as a model for Congress when it once
again enacted an income tax in 1894.' 3 Under the income tax
provisions passed by the House, a 2% tax was first imposed on the
"dividends" and "undistributed sums, or sums made or added during
the year to [the] surplus or contingent funds" of certain banks and
insurance companies." This essentially mirrored the measure
enacted in 1864 except that it followed Pennsylvania's innovation in
extending this tax to cover all corporations or limited liability
business enterprises. 45 Much like its Civil War predecessor, how-
ever, the measure was essentially a withholding tax with an
undistributed profits tax designed to protect against schemes to
avoid the dividends tax.'
42. SE IGMAN, THE INCOME TAX, supra note 34, at 452.
43. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
44. Section 59 of the House Bill provided, in relevant part:
That there shall be levied and collected a tax of 2 per cent on all dividends in
scrip or money thereafter declared due, wherever and whenever the same be
declared payable to stockholders, policy holders, or depositors or parties
whatsoever, including nonresidents, whether citizens or aliens, as part of the
earnings, income, or gains of any bank, trust company, savings institution, and
of any fire, marine, life, inland insurance company, either stock or mutual, under
whatever name or style known or called in the United States or Territories,
whether specially incorporated or existing under general laws, and on all
undistributed sums, or sums made or added during the year to their surplus or
contingent funds ....
26 CONG. REC. 6831 (1894).
45. Id.; id. at 6866 (statement of Sen. Vest) (explaining that the House bill "adopted the
system as to its details which was in the old law of 1864 and which is found in the law of
Pennsylvania to-day). Pennsylvania's law was the first to impose a tax on corporations rather
than industries and was the basis for later general corporation taxes such as the one enacted
in New York in 1880. See Seligman, The Taxation of Corporations 1, supra note 31, at 166
(discussing Pennsylvania's adoption of a general corporate tax in 1840, which provided that
"banks and all corporations whatever" shall be subject to the tax); id at 170 (describing New
York's general corporation tax and noting that it "was based on the Pennsylvania act").
46. See Bank, aupra note 6.
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In the Senate, the corporate tax provision appeared to be
dramatically changed, but this change was considered more form
than substance. Rather than imposing a tax on dividends and
undistributed profits, the Senate Finance Committee's version of the
bill, which eventually prevailed in the final act, imposed a tax
directly on the net income of corporations. 7 Under Section 32 of the
1894 Act, a 2% tax was imposed on all "corporations, companies, or
associations doing business for profit in the United States, no
matter how created and organized, but not including partner-
ships."' Senator George Vest, the person responsible for the new
language, explained:
Instead of making the corporation a collector simply for the
Government, we have endeavored to simplify the bill and, in my
judgment we have strengthened it, by putting the tax directly
upon the corporation and then allowing the corporation to adjust
its relations with its own stockholders as it sees proper."9
The intent was to combine the separate dividend and undistributed
profits tax provisions into one step.50 Since late nineteenth century
corporations commonly distributed virtually all their profits to the
stockholders as dividends,51 it was reasonable to view the corporate
47. See 26 CONG. REc. 6866 (1894).
48. § 32, 28 Stat. at 556. In full, the statute provided as follows:
That there shall be assessed, levied, and collected, except as herein otherwise
provided, a tax of two per centum annually on the net profits or income above
actual operating and business expenses, including expenses for materials
purchased for manufacture or bought for resale, losses, and interest on bonded
and other indebtedness of all banks, banking institutions, trust companies,
savings institutions, fire, marine, life, and other insurance companies, railroad,
canal, turnpike, canal navigation, slack water, telephone, telegraph, express,
electric light, gas, water, street railway companies, and all other corporations,
companies, or associations doing business for profit in the United States, no
matter how created and organized, but not including partnerships.
Id.
49. 26 CoNG. REC. 6866 (1894) (statement of Sen. Vest).
50. Id. at 6880 (statement of Sen. Chandler) (claiming that Senator Vest "seems to have
thought that he could roll all those sections into one" by imposing an income tax).
51. See id. at 6869 (statement of Sen. Allison). According to Senator Allison:
[The tax on the undistributed profits] will be an infinitesimal amount as
respects all the great corporations and the little corporations of our country,
because there is nothing carried to the surplus account except in the case of
national banks, where they are obliged to carry a certain portion of their
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income tax as the equivalent of a withholding tax, or a tax in lieu of
the regular tax on shareholders.
Consistent with this withholding tax notion, Congress was
careful to structure the corporate income tax to avoid double
taxation. Section 28 of the Act excluded from income dividends
received from entities already taxed under the Act.52 As under the
1864 Act, however, this was only a partial solution because the
entity-level tax could not be avoided by reason of the individual-
level $4,000 exemption." Thus, for shareholders with incomes
below the exemption level, the tax on corporate income imposed
an indirect tax where none should have been imposed at all.
Nevertheless, the intent was to avoid double taxation.54
Although the Court subsequently struck down the 1894 Act's
income tax provisions as unconstitutional, 5 the corporate income
tax continued to be used as a shareholder proxy tax when Congress
adopted a federal excise tax on corporations that was measured by
income in 1909.' The 1909 Act was never a threat to impose double
taxation because, unlike under the 1894 Act, the corporate tax was
not accompanied by an individual income tax. As President Taft
admitted, the corporate excise tax was a second-best alternative or
substitute for the individual income tax barred by the Court's
decision on the 1894 Act.57 Supporters of this proposal emphasized
earnings to surplus from year to year and perhaps other banks and insurance
companies. But as to the great body of the corporations of our country they make
dividends covering practically [all] their earnings each year.
Id.
52. § 28, 28 Stat. at 554.
53. Id. at 553.
54. See 26 CONG. Rzc. 6876 (1894) (recording the exchange between Sen. Dolph and Sen.
Hill in which Sen. Hill points out that the structure is designed to avoid double taxation to
the maximum extent possible).
55. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 572 (1895).
56. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 12.
57. 44 CONG. REc. 3344 (1909) (message from President Taft). He also spoke of "another
merit" of the excise tax-"the federal supervision which must be exercised in order to make
the law effective over the annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations." Id.
Indeed, Taft suggested that such a tax was "an excise tax upon the privilege of doing business
as an artificial entity and of freedom from a general partnership liability eijoyed by those who
own the stock." Id. This, however, was merely an attempt to conform to the Court's
statements regarding the ability to use an excise tax on the privilege of doing business in lieu
of an income tax. See Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 413 (1904)
(upholding a tax on the gross receipts of sugar refiners as a constitutional excise tax); Pollock,
158 U.S. at 635-37 (noting that its decision striking down the 1894 income tax as
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its ability "to reach the great accumulated wealth of the country, or
its earnings, engaged in corporate enterprise."58
Upon ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment,59 a corporate
income tax again was adopted in conjunction with the individual
income tax imposed under the Revenue Act of 1 9 1 3 .'0 Congress
minimized the risk of double taxation by excluding dividends from
the normal individual income tax."1 Originally, this exclusion
avoided double taxation automatically because, under the 1913 Act,
the corporate income tax rate was explicitly tied to the individual
normal rate.62 This link between the corporate and normal taxes
was severed in the 1916 Act, so that separate provisions determined
the rates of each, but the result was the same because the rates
were both set at 2%.'
During World War I, the corporate and normal individual tax
rates began to diverge. Under the War Revenue Act of 1917," the
second revenue measure enacted that year," an additional 2% tax
was added to the corporate income tax rate, but not to the individual
normal tax rate." According to Senate Finance Committee Chair
F.M. Simmons, the corporate rate was increased both to raise
unconstitutional did not mean that an excise tax on the privilege of doing business would be
unconstitutional).
58. 44 CONG. REc. 3756 (1909) (statement of Sen. Newlands).
59. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI.
60. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81.
61. Id. § 1I(B), 38 Stat. at 167-68.
62. From 1913 through 1915, both the maximum corporate income tax rate and the
individual normal tax rate were 1%. Id. §§ II(B), (G), 38 Stat. at 166, 172. Rather than
imposing a corporate income tax rate equivalent to the normal rate, the corporate provision
specifically provided that the normal tax levied to individuals would also be levied to
corporate income. See id. § H(G) ('[Tlhe normal tax hereinbefore imposed upon individuals
likewise shall be levied, assessed, and paid annually upon the entire net income [of) ... every
corporation[s."). Corporate income was thus subject to both the corporate income tax rate and
the individual surtax rate, if applicable, but not to the individual normal tax rate, while
noncorporate business income was subject to the individual normal tax rate and the surtax
rate, if applicable, but not the corporate income tax rate. Since the corporate rate and the
normal rate were identical, both individual and corporate income were subject to a 1% tax
plus any applicable surtax.
63. Revenue Act of 1916, §§ 1, 10, 39 Stat. at 756-57, 765-66 (1916).
64. War Revenue Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 300 (enacted Oct. 3, 1917).
65. The Revenue Act of 1917, enacted exactly seven months earlier on March 3, 1917,
imposed the first excess profits tax on corporate and partnership income. See SIDNEY RATNER,
TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 364 (photo. reprint 1980) (1967).
66. §§ 1, 4, 40 Stat. at 300-02.
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revenue and to minimize the use of the corporation as a device to
avoid the individual surtax rates.67 The additional tax was called a
"corporation surtax" because it would be difficult, if not unconsti-
tutional, to tax corporate stockholders on the undistributed profits
of a corporation, but it would also be inequitable to permit this
"discrimination against partnerships and individuals in favor of
corporations in respect to surtaxes on incomes" to continue.68
Effectively, the higher corporate rate operated like an undistributed
profits tax because it penalized attempts to use the corporation as
a method of sheltering income from the high surtax rates on
individual income.
Some believed this divergence further pushed the corporate
income tax away from its original focus on shareholder wealth.69 As
Fred Taussig observed, because of the divergence "[tihe [corporate
income] tax comes even more to be regarded not as one that serves
to reach shareholders' income, but one that is to be assimilated
to other taxes, to be shifted to the general public, and to leave
the shareholder's income undiminished."70 Notwithstanding this
apparent theoretical shift, the Revenue Act of 1918 temporarily
halted this trend by resetting the corporate and individual normal
rates to their former identity, albeit at the higher rate of 12%.71 The
precedent was set, however, and subsequent revenue acts raised the
corporate income tax rate without making corresponding increases
in the individual normal rate.72
67. See 55 CONG. REc. 5966 (1917) (statement of Sen. F.M. Simmons).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Roy G. Blakey, The War Revenue Act of 1917, 7 AM. ECON. REV. 791, 808-09
(1917); F.W. Taussig, The War Tax Act of 1917, Q. J. ECON. 1, 20 (1917).
70. Taussig, supra note 69, at 20.
71. See Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 210, 230, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062, 1075-76.
72. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1921, §§ 210, 230,42 Stat. 227,233, 252 (imposing a normal
tax of 8% and a maximum corporate income tax of 10%); Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 210, 230, 43
Stat. 253, 264, 282 (imposing a normal tax of 6% and a madmum corporate income tax of
12.5%); Revenue Act of 1926, §§ 210, 230, 44 Stat. 9, 21, 39 (imposing a normal tax of 5% and
a maximum corporate income tax of 13% in 1925 and 13.5% starting in 1926); Revenue Act
of 1928, §§ 11, 13, 45 Stat. 795, 797 (imposing a normal tax of 5% and a maximum corporate
income tax of 12%); Joint Resolution Reducing Rates of Income Tax for 1929, 46 Stat. 47
(reducing, only for 1929, the normal tax to 4% and the corporate income tax to 11%); Revenue
Act of 1932, §§ 11, 13, 47 Stat. 174, 177 (imposing a normal tax of 8% and a maximum
corporate income tax of 13.75%); Revenue Act of 1934, §§ 11, 13, 48 Stat. 684, 686 (imposing
a normal tax of 4% and a maximum corporate income tax of 13.75%); Revenue Act of 1935, §
102, 49 Stat. 1015 (raising the maximum corporate income tax to 15%).
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Despite this divergence between the base corporate and
individual income taxes, Congress maintained the exemption from
the normal individual tax for dividends and the corporate income
tax continued to be regarded, at least nominally, as a withholding
tax.73 This partial integration approach reduced the tax on corporate
income to something less than the full corporate rate, although it
still left corporate income subject to a higher pre-surtax rate burden
than noncorporate income. 7' Thus, shareholders received some relief
from the double taxation of corporate income and Congress at least
paid homage to the original shareholder focus of the corporate
income tax. It was not until 1936 that Congress deviated from this
approach by repealing the exemption from the normal tax for
dividends and thus, for the first time, subjecting corporate income
to full double taxation. This change in the tax treatment of
corporate income can be traced to the revival of an undistributed
profits tax.
II. THE ADOPTION OF AN UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX
A. Campaign of 1932
Throughout the 1930s, commentators were consumed with the
search for possible causes of the Depression and for methods of
stabilizing the economy.7 5 This was especially true as the
Democratic candidate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, prepared for the
73. See COMMrrREONTAXATIONOFTHETWENTIETHCENTURYFUND, STUDIEs IN CURRENT
TAX PROBLEMS 55 (1937) ("Until 1936 the federal government exempted dividends from the
normal personal tax if they came from a corporation that was subject to the corporation net
income tax. Obviously, the corporation income tax was to be regarded, at least in part, as a
normal tax collected at the source.").
74. In both cases, the income was subject to a base tax and, if applicable, a graduated
surtax, but this in itself was not double taxation. The surtax made the system more
progressive and was thus reallyjust a selective increase in rates.
75. See, e.g., LEONARD P. AYRES, THE ECONOMICS OF RECOVERY (1934); ELEANOR LANSING
DULLES, DEPRESSION AND RECONSTRUCTION: A STUDY OF CAUSES AND CONTROLS (1936); PAUL
EINZIG, THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRisis, 1929-1931 (1931); William W. Cumberland, Factors
Operating Toward Recovery from Depression, 5 J. BUS. U. CHI. 114 (1932); Marriner S. Eccles,
Controlling Booms and Depressions, in ECONOMIC BALANCE AND A BALANCED BUDGET 69
(Rudolph L. Weissman ed., 1940); R.T. Ely, Real Estate in the Business Cycle, 22 AM. ECON.
REV. 137, 138 (1932).
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1932 campaign for the presidency.76 Although Roosevelt himself
refused to either engage in a serious debate about the cause of the
Depression or to provide many specific suggestions for economic
recovery,77 his small circle of policy advisers-later dubbed the
"Brain Trust"-were hard at work on these issues.7' Composed
primarily of academics such as Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell,
and Adolf Berle,79 the Brain Trust outlined what became the
foundation for the New Deal in a May 19, 1932 memorandum to
then-Governor Roosevelt.80
While the May 19 memorandum identified many culprits for the
Depression, one in particular eventually assumed great importance
in the Revenue Act of 1936. In a section authored by Berle entitled
"Corporate Surpluses,""' the memorandum assigned much of the
blame for the stock market crash and subsequent Depression on
the unreasonable accumulation of corporate profits. According to
the memorandum, the prosperity of the twenties led to "a greater
accumulation of surpluses than were ever before realized in
economic history."" Rather than distributing such excess profits to
stockholders, "corporate administrators have assumed that they
76. See William Starr Myers, Looking Toward 1932,25 AM. POL. SI. REV. 925,930 (1931)
("Both parties will strive to place stress on economic questions. A serviceable and constructive
plan for the stabilization of business and the mitigation or prevention of future unemployment
would be a great asset to either party.").
77. PAUL K CONKIN, THE NEW DEAL 22 (2d ed. 1975).
78. See DANIELR. FUSFELD, THEECONOMICTHOUGHTOFFRANKLND. RoosEVELTANDTHE
ORIGINs or THE NEw DEAL 207 (1956); RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 21-22 (1939).
79. Moley taught in political science, Tugwell in economics, and Berle in law, all at
Columbia University. FUSFELD, supra note 78, at 209-10.
80. Memorandum from Raymond Moley and others, to Franklin Delano Roosevelt (May
19, 1932) (in Box 282, Folder 3, Raymond Moley Papers, Hoover Institution Library and
Archives, Stanford University) [hereinafter Memorandum ofMay 19,19321 (outlining national
program for recovery). The May 19 memorandum was written in response to a request by
Roosevelt to keep him updated during his pre-campaign vacation trip to Warm Springs. The
memorandum provided the opportunity to prepare a series of specific recommendations for
various aspects of the economic crisis and was the foundation of many of Roosevelt's campaign
speeches and eventually his acceptance speech. See FUSFELD, supra note 78, at 219; MOLEY,
supra note 78, at 21-22. Many, if not most, of the memorandum's recommendations were
eventually enacted into law.
81. Although the memorandum was written as a group project under the direction of
Moley, the individual authors of each section were identified in a handwritten note
accompanying drafts of the memo in Moley's files. See Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra
note 80 (accompanying handwritten note regarding authors of individual sections). Berle was
identified as the author of the section on corporate surplus. Id.
82. Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra note 80, at 1.
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were private funds, capable of being withdrawn from personal uses
and used to satisfy unrestrained ambitions for expansion."s This
practice of "corporate hoarding," the memorandum charged, "upset
the balance of production and consumption" and contributed both to
the stock market crash and the ensuing Depression. 4
Although subsequent studies have questioned the memo-
randum's conclusions, 85 many at the time shared the view that the
corporate accumulation of profits was a substantial problem.'
83. Id. at 4.
84. Id. at 2-3. The theory was that profits, which might have been distributed to
shareholders or paid to employees and made available for consumption, were instead left idle.
To combat the overcapacity problem, companies closed plants and prices rose (because the
company had to spread the overhead costs over fewer products) while workers went
unemployed and shareholders failed to see a return on their investment. Furthermore,
managers' investment of liquid surplus in the market enhanced volatility as managers quickly
withdrew money and parked it in short-term securities or in savings accounts. Id.
85. See SERGEI P. DOBROVOLSKY, CORPORATE INCOME RPENTION 1915-1943, at 26 (1951)
(arguing that the rate of corporate savings did not increase substantially during the twenties,
even though the absolute numbers grew); MAURICE LEvEN ET AL., AMERICA'S CAPACITY To
CONSUME 109-12 (1934) (concluding that corporate additions to surplus, while increasing in
absolute numbers, did not substantially increase as a percentage of national income);
Benjamin M. Anderson, Eating the Seed Corn, CHASE ECON. BULL. 3, 23 (May 12, 1936)
(claiming that the argument that corporate oversaving caused the depression is an economic
"fallacy"). According to John Martin:
While it is true that cash holdings of corporations increased 5.6 billions between
1926 and 1929, we cannot ignore the conclusions of the Brookings Institution
that between 1900 and 1930 the unutilized margin of productive capacity in the
United States did not increase in manufacturing, electric power utilities,
agriculture, mining (except for the dislocation of the war), and probably also
construction and merchandising.
John B. Martin, Taxation of Undistributed Corporate Profits, 35 MICH. L. REV. 44, 55 (1936).
Some of the confusion about the extent of the problem may be due to the fact that corporate
"savings" or surplus is itself an elusive concept to define. See J. Ellwood Amos, The Economics
of Corporate Saving, 22 ILL. STUD. SOC. SCI. No. 2, at 12 (1937).
86. See, e.g., Memorandum from George Haas to Roswell Magill (Sept. 1937) (on file with
the Office of Tax Analysis/Division of Tax Research; General Records of the Department of
Treasury, Record Group 56, Box 63, National Archives, College Park, MD) (regarding Tax
Revision Studies, 1937--General Statements, Revenue Estimates, Summaries and
Recommendations), available at httpJ/vww.tax.orgtthp/civilization/Documents/Surveys/
hst23732/23732-2.htm. Haas noted:
[Ilt has been argued by very respectable economic authorities, that among the
causes of the depression was the starving of consumption through the
withdrawal of too large a proportion of our national income for corporate capital
expenditure. It is also held by many that one of the vicious influences
contributing to the beat stock market boom of the late Twenties was the piling
up of liquid corporate resources through excessive retention of corporate
earnings. Stock market speculation, which had already been stimulated by the
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During a debate over the 1932 Revenue Act, Representative
McFadden reported that "[tihese corporation surpluses of
$60,000,000,000 represent hoarding upon a far greater scale than
the comparatively tiny sums which are said to be locked in safe-
deposit boxes or in family socks." 7 According to McFadden, this
accumulated surplus
is the source of the funds that were designated by the Federal
reserve bankers as bootleg money when it was invested in the
stock market and in brokers' loans in 1928-29. This was
independent money, not under the control of the Federal
reserve, and the investment of which impeded the management
of the Federal reserve to deal with the orgy of speculation in
1928 and 1929.8'
Many economists agreed with this logic. Professor Donald Gilbert
wrote in 1936:
The process of accumulating current assets therefore is an
indirect method of hoarding and, furthermore, a method which
is self-destructive for not only is consumption obstructed and a
recession in the durable goods industries invited, but stock
rapid growth in corporate earnings, was further stimulated by the volume of
funds representing undistributed earnings that was poured into brokers' loans
by corporations.
Id.; see also ALFRED G. BUEHLER, THE UNDISTRIBUTD PROFITS TAX 16 (1937) ("During the
depression there was much criticism of corporate saving, which was popularly held to be an
important cause of the depression."); MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE
NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933-1939, at 172 (1984) (noting that the concern about excessive
corporate surpluses was 'pervasive" throughout the 1930s); A Sound Tax, 142 NATION 337,
337 ('Recent studies have shown that one of the primary causes of the depression is to be
found in the tendency toward oversaving on the part of wealthy individuals and
corporations."); The Tax Debacle, 142 NATION 265, 266 (1936) (1rhe studies of the Brookings
Institution have shown that the tendency toward oversaving underlies many of our economic
difficulties.").
87. 75 CONG. REC. 6341 (1932) (statement of Rep. McFadden) (quoting from U.S.
TREASURY, STATISTICS OF INCOME, 25); see also id. at 6483 (statement of Rep. Blanton) ("Many
corporations have gotten into the habit of refusing to distribute their annual profits, but have
been setting aside each year a large proportion of such annual profits as surplus."); DAVID
CUSHMAN COYLE, BRASS TACKS 22 (1935) (1The large corporations had accumulated surpluses
before 1929 which made up a considerable item in the total of the nation's saving.").
88. 75 CONG. Izc. 6482 (statement of Rep. McFadden).
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values are pyramided to levels which cannot be maintained in
the light of reasonable profits prospects."
The result, according to Professor Gilbert, was the onset of the
Depression as investors recognized that stock prices were artificially
inflated.'
Contemporary practices among corporate boards and manage-
ment bolstered the perception that corporations were hoarding
money. One source reported that during the twenties "the notion
was rather widespread that sound financial policy required
retention in the enterprise of 50 cents out of every; dollar of net
income."91 Treasury reports indicated that between 1923 and 1929
corporations reporting net income retained more than 45% of such
income rather than distributing it to stockholders.' This was
considered very high from the perspective of the late thirties,
however, when the practice was to retain no more than 30% of net
income.9" Moreover, corporate savings far outpaced other sources of
business financing. From 1927 to 1929, for instance, manufacturing
corporations retained a total of $5.6 billion in profits while at the
same time raising only $1.8 billion through issuances of common
stock.94 Even after the onset of the Depression and despite suffering
huge operating losses, many large corporations increased their
liquid positions rather than relying on debt or equity financing.95
Not surprisingly, Roosevelt's advisers blamed corporate manage-
ment for these large surpluses. Soon before joining the Brain Trust,
Berle completed his landmark study with economist Gardiner
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property." The study
89. Donald W. Gilbert, Should the Undistributed Profits Tax Be Repealed?, 14 TAX MAG.
710, 755 (1936).
90. Id.
91. DOBROVOLSKY, supra note 85, at 13.
92. See Memorandum from George Haas to Rosswell Mogill, supra note 86, at 6 (noting
that when all corporations are considered, including those corporations reporting no net
income for the period, only 27% of net profits were retained); George Creel, The Battle Cry of
Business, COLLIER'S, Jan. 8, 1938, at 16, 30.
93. DOBROVOLSKY, supra note 85, at 13.
94. FINAL REPORT OF THE CoMMMrE OF THE NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION ON FEDERAL
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 9 n.5 (statement of Robert Murray Haig, Chairman 1939)
(presented at the 32d National Tax Conference held in San Francisco, CA, Oct. 16-19, 1939).
95. See MARRINER S. ECCLES, BECKONING FRONTIERS 260 (1951).
96. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
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documented the developing separation between the ownership and
control of large corporations. 7 One consequence of this separation
was a divergence between managers and stockholders concerning
the direction and goals of the underlying business." In what modern
observers would describe as an agency cost problem,99 managers
increasingly became interested in "profits" that could not be
distributed as dividends to stockholders, such as expansion plans
and their own job security.' According to Berle and Means, this
disintegration of the traditional notion of a profit motive suggested
that the corporation and its stockholders had surrendered the right
to operate free from outside regulation and any general obligation
to society at large.1 '1
In the May 19 memorandum, Roosevelt's advisors concluded that
the key to stabilizing the economy and correcting the imbalance
between a corporation and its stockholders was to find a mechanism
to force undistributed corporate surplus into the market. "By forcing
undistributed surplus into the general market for capital," Berle
wrote, "we could prevent the piling up of individual surpluses which,
as we now know, can only be used in ways which are disastrous to
the general economic welfare."' 2 To accomplish this, the memo-
randum suggested enacting a "tax on undistributed surplus income
of corporations.""0 ' This sought to both discourage unreasonable
accumulation of corporate surplus and simultaneously provide an
incentive for corporate managers to increase dividend distributions
to small investors, thereby breaking the cycle of overproduction and
underconsumption.
There was no shortage of legislative precedent for the
undistributed profits tax proposal. As discussed earlier,' Congress
employed an undistributed profits tax during the Civil War and
Reconstruction to supplement the dividends tax imposed on
businesses in certain industries and the House revived such a
PROPERTY (1932); FUSFELD, supra note 78, at 213.
97. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 96, at 120-21.
98. Id. at 121-22.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21.
100. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 96, at 349-50.
101. Id. at 353-54.
102. Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra note 80, at 3.
103. Id. at 4.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31 and 44-46.
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measure as part of the dividend tax enacted in 1894. Under the
modern income tax, Congress employed the undistributed profits tax
concept, but only to penalize corporations that unreasonably
accumulated profits for the purpose of evading the high surtax rates
on individual income."0 5 Because of the tax's burdensome intent
requirement, however, the provision was hardly ever enforced in its
early years.' Recognizing this problem, various sources forwarded
proposals to impose an undistributed profits tax. In 1917, Senator
Andrieus Jones of New Mexico proposed to tax corporations on a
certain percentage of their undistributed profits regardless of the
purpose for the retention."7 A bill introduced by the Senate Finance
Committee to adopt this proposal was rejected in 1917 and again
in 1924, although the latter bill actually passed the Senate
before being rejected by the House.10 In 1928, the Staff of the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation revived the un-
distributed profits tax proposal, but Congress rejected it amid
concerns about making such a radical change during a period of
business expansion.1°9
At the same time Congress was toying with the idea, an
undistributed profits tax began to receive support in other quarters.
In 1920, Thomas S. Adams, a Yale economics professor and an
advisor to the Treasury, advanced an undistributed profits tax
as a method of equalizing the treatment of incorporated and
unincorporated enterprises." Testifying before the House Ways and
Means Committee, Adams acknowledged some potential problems
with the proposal, but nevertheless supported adopting.such a tax
should Congress repeal the excess profits tax."1 Perhaps under
105. See Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(A)2, 38 Stat. 114, 166-67.
106. See 75 CONG. REC. 6478 (1932) (statement of Rep. Frear) (suggesting that no tax had
ever been assessed against a corporation under the provision, although later conceding that
recent efforts had produced some success); WALTER LAMBERT, THE NEW DEAL REVENUE ACTS:
THE PoLrTIcs OF TAXATION 273 (1970).
107. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 274; Martin, supra note 85, at 44.
108. LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 274; Note, The Surtax on Undistributed Profits, 50 HARV.
L. REv. 332, 332 n.2 (1936).
109. Roy G. BLAEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INcoME TAx 405 (1940).
110. See Thomas S. Adams, Immediate Future of the Excess Profits Tax, 10 AM. ECON. REV.
SUPP. 15 (1920). The theory was that the undistributed profits tax would ensure that both
corporate and partnership income would be subject to the high surtax rates on individual
income. Id.
111. See Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1920-21, Before the House Comm. On Ways and
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Adams' influence, the Secretary of the Treasury recommended
an undistributed profits tax as a substitute for the excess profits
tax in his 1920 annual report."2 Although never adopted, this
recommendation was not without its supporters in the business and
academic community. The National Association of Credit Men
issued a pamphlet in 1920 urging Congress to replace the excess
profits tax with an undistributed profits tax." Professor Fred
Fairchild, a Yale economist, also wrote in support of such a tax, but
only if it was structured to equalize the treatment of businesses and
not to penalize the reinvestment of earnings.'1
Although the undistributed profits tax was previously supported
as a way to equalize the taxation of businesses or to prevent tax
avoidance, a larger goal appeared to motivate Roosevelt's advisers
when they proposed the undistributed profits tax in the May 19
memorandum. This apparent goal was to promote the government
planned economy outlined by Rex Tugwell in his 1933 book, The
Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts.115 According to
Tugwell, both the Depression as well as the boom and bust of the
business cycle were attributable to a misallocation of capital
resources."' "[Why are prices so high or incomes so low that they
cannot buy what they wish?" Tugwell asked. "This evidently cannot
be answered completely, but even a partial explanation seems to
involve reference to our inexpert allocation of capital. For this in
itself involves high costs which must be covered in selling prices.""'
Under a system of self-allocation, managerial hoarding of
corporate profits was inevitable as "[i]ndustries, because of their
past and present successes, regardless of temporary luck, [grew]
overconfident of the future and expand their own activities beyond
all reason."" 8
Means, Part I, 66th Cong. 17 (1920) (statement of Prof. Thomas S. Adams).
112. See BUEHLER, supra note 86, at 9-10; LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 274.
113. BUEHLER, supra note 86, at 10.
114. See Fred R. Fairchild, Suggestions for Revision of the Federal Taxation of Income and
Profits, 10 AM. ECON. REV. 785, 789 (1920).
115. RExioRD G. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL ARTS
(1933); see FUSFELD, supra note 78, at 210 ("All three [Moley, Tugwell, and Berle] were agreed
that the federal government must take a more positive role in economic life. Of the three men,
Tugwell has been most closely associated with that idea.").
116. TUGWELL, supra note 115, at 203.
117. Id. at 204.
118. Id. at 205.
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Tugwell's prescription for the problem was to "drive corporate
surpluses into the open investment market" and out of the hands of
managers through "a tax ... imposed on funds, over and above
replacement, which are kept for expansion purposes."119 If such a tax
"forced these funds into distribution as dividends, they would have
to seek reinvestment through the regular channels, and a concern's
plans for expansion would be subject to check in the investment
market."12 Under Tugwell's larger vision for the economy, this
move to increase market control of the allocation of capital would
fall short of the more formal system of national planning he
advocated. 1 Nevertheless, Tugwell suggested that an undistributed
profits tax, when combined with the substitution of federal for state
incorporation, would be an "eminently practical" way to address the
nation's economic problems. 1
22
Despite the historical precedent and strong intellectual backing
for an undistributed profits tax in 1932, there was no rush to action
after Roosevelt took office. This was partly because Roosevelt was
worried that such a program might arouse business opposition in
the event of an economic slowdown and lead to a counterattack on
his other New Deal policies.' The May 19 memorandum, however,
clearly did make an impact on Roosevelt. In his July 1932
acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in
Chicago, for example, he attributed the Depression to heavy
"corporate surpluses" used to finance "unnecessary plants" and
rampant pre-crash stock market speculation. 124 After taking office,
Roosevelt continued to discuss the undistributed profits tax concept
with his advisers. He even favorably reviewed Tugwell's more
radical suggestion that the government create a bank in which all
119. Id. at 206.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 205 ("Capital allocation would depend on knowledge, from some planning
agency, of how much for a measured future period ought to be put to one use rather than to
another. Given this information, the first step in control would be to limit self-allocation.);
see also FuSj'LD, supra note 78, at 211 ("Planning was the solution to the problem, and
Tugwell advocated creation of a national economic council to act as a planning agency.").
122. FUSFELD, supra note 78, at 207.
123. W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in
DOES ATLAS SHmuo? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXmG THE Ric 29, 51 (2000).
124. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech Accepting the 1932 Democratic Presidential
Nomination (July 2, 1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 651 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938); see BUEHLER, supra note 86, at 18.
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undistributed profits would be deposited and either lent out for
expansion projects deemed to be nationally important or returned
to the depositing business on the payment of a significant tax."5 By
1935, perhaps influenced by Treasury's backing of the undistributed
profits tax in the December 1934 tax package, 2 ' Roosevelt appeared
to be pushing toward an attack on corporate surplus. In his message
to Congress on June 19, Roosevelt declared that ultimately we
might need to use taxation to "discourage unwieldy and unnecessary
corporate surpluses."'27 Despite such rhetoric, Roosevelt did not
publicly propose that Congress adopt the undistributed profits tax
in either its radical or mild forms until a budgetary crisis arose
toward the end of his first term in office. 28
B. 1936 and the Revival of the Undistributed Profits Tax
On January 3,1936, Roosevelt announced in his annual message
to Congress that "it is my belief based on existing laws that no new
taxes, over and above the present taxes, are either advisable or
necessary."29 Thus, he recommended few changes to the existing
tax structure in submitting his budget to Congress.' 0 Shortly there-
after, however, developments on both the judicial and legislative
fronts opened two gaping holes in his proposed budget and forced
him to revisit the tax question.
Three days after Roosevelt's message to Congress, the Supreme
Court opened the first big hole in the President's budget. In
United States v. Butler,'' the Court struck down the Agricultural
Adjustment Act and thus invalidated the processing taxes Roosevelt
had counted on to finance the Act's operations.'32 Under the Act, the
125. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 172.
126. See id. at 173; ECCLES, supra note 95, at 256.
127. BUEHLER, supra note 86, at 19 n.1.
128. Ellis Hawley suggested that by the end of 1935 it seemed likely that Roosevelt would
postpone consideration of the undistributed profits tax indefinitely. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY,
THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 352 (1966).
129. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 3, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANxLIN D. ROOSEVELT 17 (Samuel I. Rosennan ed., 1938).
130. See BUEHLER, supra note 86, at 20.
131. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
132. This decision was one ofmany attacks led by the Supreme Court on New Deal policies
that forced Roosevelt to reconsider his ill-fated court-packing scheme. See ECCLES, supra note
95, at 257.
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Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to pay farmers not to
produce a particular commodity when prices for that commodity
fell to dangerously low levels."l 3 To finance such payments, the
Act authorized the levying of a processing tax on the particular
commodity at issue.1 " Applying a fairly narrow reading of the
taxing and spending clauses, the Court struck down the Act and its
processing taxes as unconstitutional.135 This outcome was not
entirely unanticipated. Roosevelt had warned during his 1936
Annual Budget Message that "[i]f the attack which has been made
upon this act is sustained, we will have to face the problem of
financing existing contracts for benefit payments out of some form
of new taxes."" As a result, Roosevelt needed to replace the $500
million from the processing taxes by tapping other sources.
37
Congress opened a second big hole in Roosevelt's budget by
overriding a presidential veto to pass the Adjusted Compensation
Payment Act of 1936."~ Originally, Congress gave World War I
veterans a bonus payable in 1945.139 The 1936 Act accelerated
payment on the veterans' bonuses to provide for an immediate cash
settlement in 1936 of almost $2 billion.1' ° Financing this payment
added an annual carrying charge of $120 million to the budget over
133. Butler, 297 U.S. at 54-55.
134. Id. at 55. As the Court pointed out, effectively the plan was "to take money from the
processor and bestow it upon farmers who will reduce their acreage for the accomplishment
of the proposed end." Id. at 58-59.
135. Id. at 111. According to the Court:
[The Act] invades the reserved rights of the states. It is a statutory plan to
regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers
delegated to the federal government. The tax, the appropriation of the funds
raised, and the direction for their disbursement, are but parts of the plan. They
are but means to an unconstitutional end.
Id.
136. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Budget Message (Jan. 3, 1936), in 5 THE PUBLIc
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 18, 28 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938)
(quoting from the Summation of the 1936 Budget).
137. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 267.
138. See Revenue Act, 1936: Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 74th
Cong. (1936) [hereinafter 1936 Senate Hearings] (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury), reprinted in 16 U.S. REVENUE ACm, 1909-1950; THE LAWS,
LEGISLATrVE HISTORIES, AND ADMINISTRATwE DOCUMENTS 2 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed.,
1979).
139. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 170.
140. See id.; BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 109, at 401.
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the next nine years.' 4 ' Combined with the $500 million shortfall
caused by the Court's decision on processing taxes, Roosevelt needed
to come up with $620 million in additional annual revenue in order
to avoid cutting any of his New Deal programs or incurring a deficit.
To address this budgetary crisis, Roosevelt and his advisers
once again explored the possibility of an undistributed profits tax. 1
42
They first ruled out any effort to obtain the necessary revenues by
increasing income taxes or taxes on commodities during an election
year.1"8 Instead, Roosevelt and his advisers began to focus on
raising revenue by closing significant avenues of tax evasion and
avoidance.'" In the eyes of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau,
the previously shelved undistributed profits tax proposal was ideal
for this task.14 Treasury estimated that approximately $4.5 billion
in corporate profits would go undistributed in 1936." Given the
large spread between the corporate and individual income tax rates
and the accumulated earning tax's apparent failure to guard against
abuses of the corporate form to take advantage of this spread,
Morgenthau considered the undistributed profits tax to be a
valuable tool against tax avoidance." 7 If those funds were either
taxed as undistributed profits or distributed as dividends taxable
to the individual shareholders under the personal income tax,
the government stood to gain as much as $1.3 billion in additional
revenue.148
141. See LEE, supra note 86, at 170; RATNER, supra note 65, at 472.
142. See JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF CRISIS, 1928-
1938, at 306 (1959).
143. Id. at 305; HAWLEY, supra note 129, at 352; see also Revenue Act, 1936: Hearings on
H.R. 12395 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1936)
[hereinafter 1936 House Hearings] (statement of Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Treasury Department) (explaining that 61% of Federal revenues were already
derived from consumption taxes and income taxes could not be increased without first
addressing tax evasion), reprinted in 15 U.S. REvENuE ACTS 1909-1950; THE LAWS,
LEGISLATrVE HISTORIEs, AND ADMINISTRATiVE DOCUMENTS 18 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed.,
1979).
144. BUEHIER, supra note 86, at 20.
145. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 4-5 (statement of Henry Morgenthau,
Jr., Secretary of the Treasury).
146. BLUM, supra note 142, at 307.
147. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 4-5 (statement of Henry Morgenthau,
Jr., Secretary of the Treasury); Brownlee, supra note 123, at 53-54.
148. BLUM, supra note 142, at 307.
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Although Roosevelt was likely unconvinced by the national
planning angle Tugwell emphasized in his earlier advocacy of the
undistributed profits tax,149 the tax was deemed attractive for more
than just its ability to offset the shortfall in revenue or guard
against tax avoidance. First, as Tugwell and Berle had pointed out
in 1932, many expected the tax would aid the economy while
preventing any recurrence of the conditions leading up to the crash
and ensuing Depression. ' ° Herman Oliphant, Treasury's general
counsel and one of the undistributed profits tax's biggest supporters
at the time, 1 believed increasing dividends would stimulate the
economy by increasing consumer spending.'52 Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Marriner Eccles also favored adopting the tax as
a method of stabilizing the economy, suggesting that the existence
of large corporate surpluses "tended to nullify any attempts at
monetary and credit controls by the Reserve System." 53 Second,
the undistributed profits tax was viewed as an antitrust device.
According to the proponents of this view, large corporate surpluses
encouraged monopoly and concentration by providing the capital for
acquisitions and by preventing stockholders from reinvesting
amounts received as dividends in smaller ventures.' For instance,
Robert Jackson, then an assistant attorney general in charge of the
Tax Division in ,the Department of Justice, complained that the
"antiquated tax laws" permitted corporate managers to use
surpluses "to finance monopolistic practices."55 Although this
antitrust argument was often considered less important,1 56 there
was a general belief that the undistributed profits tax could
149. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 173 ("By the time the tax received. approval at the top
levels of the Treasury, Tugwell's notion of government supervision of the investment process
seems to have played a smaller role.").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
151. See Max Lerner, The Corporate Tax Battle, 144 NATION 669 (1936).
152. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 307.
153. ECCLES, supra note 95, at 260.
154. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 307; W. ELuOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN
AMERICA: A SHORT HIHSTORY 77-78 (1996); LEFF, supra note 86, at 173; Brownlee, supra note
123, at 54.
155. Robert H. Jackson, The Proposed Revision of Corporation Taxes, 2 VITAL SPEECHEs
431,432 (1936).
156. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 173-74.
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"democratize corporate finance" by transferring power to small
stockholders.
15 7
By mid-February, Roosevelt approved the idea of an
undistributed profits tax and directed Treasury officials to work out
some of the details of the proposal.' In 1932, the undistributed
profits tax sketched out for then-candidate Roosevelt would have
effected only "a modification of taxes on corporate income." 59 In
1936, however, Oliphant persuaded Treasury to devise a more
radical solution to the problem of taxing corporate income.' 6°
Under this new proposal, the undistributed profits tax would not
merely supplement the corporate income tax, but would replace it
entirely.61 Treasury believed this would force most income to be
distributed as dividends and therefore be subject to personal income
taxation, including the high surtaxes on individual income. 1 2 This
pass-through design was consistent with the prevailing view among
economists that corporate income should -neither be subject to
double taxation nor free from personal taxation. 6 '
On March 3, Roosevelt addressed Congress in a supplemental
budget message.' Ostensibly, the message was merely to announce
the need for an additional $620 million in revenue to replace the
processing taxes and fund the veterans' bonuses. Indeed, Roosevelt
made a point of acknowledging Congress's discretion to determine
the appropriate means to raise such revenue.' His true aim,
however, was to push his proposal for an undistributed profits
tax.'6 In advocating for the undistributed profits tax, Roosevelt did
157. LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 270; see LEFF, supra note 86, at 173 ("Although the theme
of dispersing power to the stockholders cropped up frequently, the allied antimonopoly thrust
was secondary.").
158. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 307.
159. Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra note 80, at 3.
160. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 308 (crediting Oliphant with influencing Treasury to
make the change to its proposal).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 175.
164. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Supplemental Budget Message to the Congress (Mar. 3,
1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 102 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1938).
165. Id. at 104-05 ("I leave, of course, to the discretion of the Congress the formulation of
the appropriate taxes for the needed permanent revenue.").
166. Id. at 105.
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not mention its positive effect on the economy or its incidental use
in antitrust enforcement. Roosevelt instead emphasized the tax's
two more politically saleable features:1 67 (1) the ability to equalize
the treatment of all business owners, and (2) the promise to "stop
'leaks' in present surtaxes."' As to the former, Roosevelt noted the
present inequity whereby businesses utilizing the corporate form
could accumulate profits without penalty, while businesses
operating as partnerships or sole proprietors were subject to tax
regardless of whether any profits were withdrawn from the
business.'69 As to the latter, Roosevelt observed that "[riepeated
attempts by the Congress to prevent [the evasion of high surtaxes
through the unnecessary retention of corporate earnings] have not
been successful."' 70 According to Roosevelt, "[a] proper tax on
corporate income ... which is not distributed as earned, would
correct the serious twofold inequality in our taxes on business
profits" by forcing corporations to distribute profits to their
shareholders and thereby taxing those profits at the shareholders'
individual rates as is done for partnerships and sole proprie-
torships.17' Treasury estimated the tax's combined effect on
undistributed earnings and the increased distribution of taxable
dividends would be to increase revenues by at least the $620 million
dollars necessary to make up the budget shortfall. 72
Notably, Roosevelt's proposal was not designed to subject
corporate income to double taxation. Roosevelt stated that the
undistributed profits tax would accomplish its goals only "if
accompanied by a repeal of the present corporate income tax, the
capital stock tax, the related excess profits tax and the present
exemption of dividends from the normal tax on individual
incomes.""7 3 While undistributed corporate income would be subject
to double taxation through the application of the undistributed
profits tax and, when distributed in later years, the individual
normal tax, distributed corporate income would avoid the partial
167. See LFF, supra note 86, at 175-77.
168. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Supplemental Budget Message to Congress (Mar. 3, 1936),
in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 164, at 105.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 106.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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double taxation imposed under the existing spread between the
corporate and individual normal rates. Thus, not only was
Roosevelt's original plan not intended to result in double taxation,
it was designed to provide corporations with a means to integrate
the corporate and shareholder-level taxes with respect to their own
income.
III. DOUBLE TAXATION AS A TOOL IN THE ATTACK ON THE
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX
A. Prelude to the Revenue Act of 1936
Initial reaction to Roosevelt's March 3 message was quite
positive. 74 Many of his supporters in Congress and the press hailed
the undistributed profits tax idea as a "master political stroke," a
"natural," and "politically painless" because of its ability to raise the
necessary revenues by imposing a tax on a small, generally wealthy,
segment of the population. 76 A New York Times editorial noted that
the proposal already had "strengthened public confidence in the
integrity of the Government's credit" as evidenced by "the prompt
oversubscription in a single day of the enormous issue of bonds and
notes offered by the Treasury .. The Nation boldly concluded
that "[n]o tax could be devised which would be less likely to alienate
the voters."' 77
174. Such positive reaction was not confined to political commentators. See, e.g., Sprague
Likes Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1936, at 3 (reporting that Professor O.M.W. Sprague of
the Harvard Business School, a former fiscal adviser to the Treasury and the Bank of
England, indicated that the tax was "a step in the right direction").
175. BUEHLER, supra note 86, at 23; George B. Bryant, Jr., Reform Motive in Tax Program,
BARRON'S, Mar. 30, 1936, at 13; Arthur Krock, House Is Finding New Problems as Tax Bill Is
Studied, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1936, at 22; see alsoA Sound Tax, supra note 86, at 337 ("[Ihe
President's proposed tax on-undivided corporation profits represents masterly strategy.... [H]e
has saved Congress from the painful necessity of imposing an income or sales impost on the
eve of a national election."); Taxing Corporate Surplus, 86 NEW REPuBLIC 153 (1936) ("[The
undistributed profits tax proposal] is thought by many commentators to be merely an
ingenious way of escaping the wrath that would follow an increase of income-tax rates in an
election year.").
176. Editorial, The President's Message, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1936, at 20.
177. A Sound Tax, supra note 86, at 337; see also Robinson Urges Speed on Tax Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1936, at 3 (quoting the reaction of numerous members of Congress, including
that of the Speaker of the House, who said that "it will meet with the approval of the majority
of people"). As one commentator pointed out in describing the political virtues of the tax, "[ilt
[Vol. 44:167198
THE RISE OF DOUBLE TAXATION
Notwithstanding the glowing appraisals of the President's
strategy, observers did recognize that the proposal was likely to
arouse "deep opposition" on the part of corporate managers.178 Alfred
Buehler reported that "utihe business world ... was aghast at the
proposal and shuddered at the consequences if it were adopted."'79
Under then-prevailing dividend practices, the tax could not possibly
raise the required $620 million in revenue. °80 Thus, the rates would
have to be set high enough to "compel0 corporations radically to
alter their present dividend policy" in order to reach its revenue
goals. ' This would force many corporations to rely more heavily on
expensive and intrusive external financing sources, something
managers are generally disinclined to do especially when the
alternative is simply to dip into retained earnings.8 2 Perhaps more
offensive to managers, a forced change in dividend policy would
effectively substitute "the blanket judgment of Congress and the
Treasury Department, based on a general theory" for the "individual
judgment of business managers, based on their direct knowledge of
the needs of their particular company." l"
For a number of reasons, observers discounted the political force
of such opposition. First, corporate managers were not expected to
favor Roosevelt's re-election in any event.' As Herman Oliphant
remarked, "i]f we have to fight, we might as well fight the people
who are our enemies anyway."8 5 Second, stockholders would
support anything that forced managers to disgorge corporate profits
and thus would not join the corporate managers' campaign against
the tax. Writing soon after Roosevelt's speech, New York Times
seems to avoid any tax upon 99 per cent of the voters. It raises the tax upon the remaining 1
per cent, who in the opinion of the aforementioned 99 per cent should pay higher taxes
anyway.' Joseph Stagg Lawrence, A Death Sentence for Thrift, 93 REV. REVS. 40, 41 (1936).
178. Arthur Krock, Opposition is Divided Over President's Tax Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 1936, at 20.
179. BUEHLER, supra note 86, at 23.
180. See The New Tax Schedule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1936, at 20.
181. Id.
182. See Jensen, supra note 17, at 323 ("Financing projects internally avoids this
monitoring and the possibility the funds will be unavailable or available only at high explicit
prices.").
183. Punishing Prudence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1936, at 22.
184. See Krock, supra note 178, at 22.
185. BLUM, supra note 142, at 308 (quoting Herman Oliphant).
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columnist Arthur Krock argued that stockholders' support of the
undistributed profits tax had deep-seated roots:
The President is fortunate in choosing a battleground between
two split wings of the opposing forces. For a long time
Washington has received complaints against managers of
large corporations who, exercising minority control, decided to
pile up large surpluses instead of passing them out in the form
of dividends. This was done without consulting the scattered
stockholding majorities, under powers granted by the charters
of the corporation. But, however legal, and, in numerous
instances, however wise, the policy has irritated many
stockholders with the need or the wish for accessions to
income.'"
The immediate rise in the stock market after Roosevelt's speech
appeared to bolster the view that stockholders supported the
undistributed profits tax in spite of its promise to subject dividends
to the normal tax. 7 As Krock observed, stockholders "seem for the
present to be thinking only of the dividends, now piled up for
reserves and other purposes, which they hope will be released by the
new law." "'c Finally, some speculated that the proposal's bias in
favor of existing surpluses would convince managers in larger
corporations to remain silent while the tax hampered the financing
efforts of their younger competitors." 9 Although contrary to
Roosevelt's stated goal of equalizing the treatment of businesses,' g°
186. Krock, supra note 178, at 22; see also W.R. Draper, Letter to the Editor, Salaries,
Taxes, and Dividends, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1936, at 4 (complaining about "the flippant and
often insulting replies made by corporation presidents to stockholders who ask why they do
not receive dividends when the aforesaid officials are drawing down enormous salaries" and
suggesting that "[tihese 'brass collars' are riding for a fall just the same as the old time
railroad man").
187. A Sound Tax, supra note 86, at 337; What's News, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1936, at 1
("The stock market bullishly construed this move [the announcement of the undistributed
profits tax recommendation] to turn a greater share of earnings into dividend channels.
Industrial shares gained sharply."); Abreast of the Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1936, at 17
("Traders yesterday took a little time to assimilate the President's message to Congress
advocating a radical change in corporate taxation methods. When they did, a wave of buying
occurred that sent most of the list strongly upward and the industrial averages into new high
ground.").
188. Krock, supra note 178, at 22.
189. Id.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
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this unintended bias nonetheless suggested that the proposal would
find little serious opposition in Congress.
Such appraisals clearly underestimated the political force of the
opposition. While business leaders remained relatively quiet as a
House subcommittee feverishly worked to turn the proposal into a
bill for Congress's consideration,19' this was hardly because they had
accepted defeat on the matter. During this period, corporate
managers and their lobbyists in the various national and local trade
groups quietly started what later became a very open and public
attack on the proposed tax.192 The strategy primarily involved
two tactics. The first and clearly preferred tactic was to oppose
the undistributed profits tax in any form. 9 When that tactic
failed and enactment of some form of undistributed profits tax
appeared inevitable, opponents used a second tactic. They supported
measures that would minimize the burden at the corporate level
and transfer it to the individual level so as to neutralize the effect
of any remaining undistributed profits tax.19' Double taxation,
because of its ability to counteract any shareholder calls for
191. According to an article in Barron's magazine:
The remarkable lack of visible opposition to the proposal to date can be
explained easily. It does not necessarily mean that business and industry will
accept it without question and opposition. The scheme, thus far, has been in a
purely formulative stage, and its effects upon the interests most vitally
concerned cannot be definitely appraised.
George B. Bryant, Jr., Reform Motive in Tax Program, BARRON'S, Mar. 30, 1936, at 13.
According to an article in the New York Times:
Organized business groups are reserving any public criticism of the President's
plan for taxing corporate surpluses until later, it developed in a canvas of
association offices yesterday. Advices received by some of the associations from
Washington offices are to the effect that opposition to the measure will develop
within the coming ten days ....
Trade Groups Study Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1936, at 30.
192. See Turner Catledge, Public Opinion Wins a Victory in Tax Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, May
10, 1936, § IV, at 3.
In preparing the ground [for their attack on the tax proposal] not a single
insidious lobbyist's methods has [sic] been employed. No letters have gone out
from the national headquarters of this or that organization directing a mass
protest on Washington as to the corporate tax. Senators' mail on the subject has
been singularly light.
Id.
193. See infra Part III.B.1. (discussing business testimony against the bill in the House
Ways and Means Committee Hearings).
194. See infra Part III.B.2. (discussing business testimony against the bill in the Senate
Finance Committee Hearings).
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increased dividends in response to the undistributed profits tax,
eventually became a significant weapon in this second prong of the
attack on the undistributed profits tax.
Perhaps most significant about this campaign against the
undistributed profits tax was the involvement of large cor-
porations, both directly and through lobbying organizations that
they effectively controlled during the period, including, the
National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce.195 While the small, undercapitalized businesses, which
were most likely, to be affected by the tax, also were active
opponents of the bill, corporations with professional managers led
the charge. Despite retaining a lower percentage of profits and
possessing a larger accumulated surplus than their smaller
competitors,' big business dominated the testimony over the bills
195. See LEFn, supra note 86, at 244 ('To some extent, this unity [of the business
community in opposition to the tax] reflected the dominance of giant corporations in industrial
associations."). For instance, while the National Association of Manufacturers nominally
represented a broad cross-section of industry, large corporations dominated its decision-
making body throughout the New Deal and the World War 1I period. See Philip H. Burch, Jr.,
The NAM as an Interest Group, 4 POL. & SOcVY 97, 103 (1973).
Throughout the New Deal-World War II years an average of about sixty-five to
seventy percent of the membership of the executive committee was composed of
representatives of big industrial concerns, and in some years eighty percent or
more of these important figures was drawn from such select business circles.
Id.; see also Alfred S. Cleveland, NAM: Spokesman for Industry?, 26 HARv. Bus. Rrv. 353,365
(1948) ('[The identity of the inner policy-making group indicates that active leadership
within the NAM comes primarily from among the very largest manufacturing corporations
.. ); Richard W. Gable, NAM: Influential Lobby or Kiss of Death?, 15 J. POL. 254, 259-60
(1953).
In practice, therefore, the board has constitutionally unlimited power in making
all policy decisions. This group has been heavily weighted in favor of an active
minority which represents conservative, big businesses and which is an
unrepresentative sample of NAM members in terms of size, wealth, and number
of employees.
... Between 1933 and 1937 a total of almost $4 million was collected. A group of
262 companies--among the largest and most powerful in the nation-supplied
almost 50 per cent of that total.
Id.; Richard Walter Gable, A Political Analysis of an Employers' Association: The National
Association of Manufacturers 242-43 (1950) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Chicago) (on file with The University of Chicago library) ("[11n terms of corporate size and
number of employees, the leadership of the Association since 1933 has not been, on the whole,
reflective of NAM members, much less of American industry.").
196. See CALOMXRIS & HUBBARD, supra note 16, at 23 (stating that small corporations in
growing industries bore the brunt of the burden of the undistributed profits tax); John W. Lee,
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in the House and Senate and waged an active campaign against
the tax in the press.1" Their effect on the ultimate result cannot
be understated. According to Mark Leff, "The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, overseeing the details of tax legislation, served as a
prime information source for many congressmen, even drafting
major Republican amendments."' g As Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau later recalled, "The opposition from the conservative
press and big business, and their influence in both parties on the
Hill, made a terrific impact. ""1 '
The involvement of large corporations and their professional
managers should not be surprising given Berle and Means' evidence
of the growing problem of agency costs."°° In their study, they
found that shareholders were becoming increasingly distant
and separated from the professional managers who controlled
the business enterprise.2°1 As a consequence, it was no longer
possible to automatically assume that "those in control of a modern
corporation will also choose to operate it in the interests of the
owners."2" On the issue of the undistributed profits tax, this
agency cost problem was readily apparent. While many investors
apparently welcomed the prospect of receiving increased dividend
distributions as a result of the tax,m corporate managers felt quite
differently. Managers "feared government intervention into a
politically vulnerable, faltering investment process" and waged a
full-scale counter-offensive to protect their control over corporate
profits.2 1
4
A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: 'Hey the Stars Might
Lie But the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEX L. REV. 885, 951-52 (2000) (noting most public
corporations distributed 70% or more of their earnings). But see Turner Catledge, Senators
Fails to Agree on a Corporate Tax Bill; Fight May Go to Floor, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1936, at
1 (reporting figures submitted by Treasury Department officials that indicated many large
corporations would indeed pay higher taxes under the House bill).
197. See BLUM, supra note 142.
198. LEP, supra note 86, at 275.
199. See BLtM, supra note 142, at 319.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
201. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 96, at 113 (*The position of the owner has been
reduced to that of having a set of legal and factual interests in the enterprise while the group
which we have called control, are in the position of having legal and factual powers over it.").
202. Id. at 121.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88 (describing the rise in the stock market in
response to Roosevelt's speech proposing the adoption of an undistributed profits tax).
204. LEFF, supra note 86, at 247.
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B. The Campaign to Defeat the Tax in the Revenue Act of 1936
1. House
At the end of March, the House Ways and Means Committee
conducted Hearings to consider the undistributed profits tax.2 5
After working for three weeks to turn the undistributed profits tax
idea into a workable tax bill, a Ways and Means subcommittee
delivered its final version on March 30.2" Under the bill, the
corporate income tax would be replaced by an undistributed profits
tax graduated according to the percentage of net income retained.2 7
For corporations with an annual net income of $10,000 or less, the
rates ranged from 1% on the first 10% of undistributed net income
to 29.7% on undistributed net income of 70.3% or more.2"s For
corporations with annual income in excess of $10,000, the bill
proposed rates ranging from 4% on the first 10% of undistributed
net income to a maximum of 42.5% on undistributed net income of
57.5% or more.' The definition of "undistributed net income"
included adjusted net income less taxable dividends and the
undistributed profits tax itself.2 10 The bill exempted or provided
special treatment for banks, insurance companies, corporations in
receivership, foreign corporations and corporations that were
contractually or legally prohibited from paying dividends. 2 ' Finally,
the bill subjected dividends received to the normal tax on
individuals.212
Guy Helvering, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, opened
the hearings on behalf of the Treasury Department by explaining
205. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 1. A Ways and Means subcommittee opened
the hearings with a detailed recommendation in favor of an undistributed profits tax similar
to the one Roosevelt recommended to Congress. Id. at 4-13.
206. See BUEHLZR, supra note 86, at 25.
207. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 5.
208. Id. at 5-6.
209. Id. at 6.
210. Id. at 5.
211. Id. at 6-11. Banks and insurance companies were required to keep a certain amount
of surplus income on hand under state and federal regulations, while the latter three types
of corporations were either unable to pay out all of their income as dividends or, in the case
of foreign corporations, were subject to the dividend rules of other countries. Id.
212. Id. at 9.
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the benefits of the proposed tax.213 "The primary purposes of the
proposal," according to Helvering, were:
[F]irst, to eliminate the present inequalities in our taxation of
business profits as between incorporated and unincorporated
business; second, to remove a very important source of tax
avoidance that inheres in our present income-tax laws; and
third, as a consequence of the elimination of inequalities and
sources of tax avoidance, to increase the Federal revenues to the
extent necessary to balance the regular Budget of the Federal
Government.214
This essentially reiterated the benefits outlined by Roosevelt when
he recommended the undistributed profits tax in his message to
Congress.21
More revealing than Helvering's reasons for Treasury's support
of the proposal was his response to the concerns already expressed
by corporate managers. "There is no intention or desire whatever to
interfere with the internal management of business enterprises,"
Helvering declared.21
The object of the proposed revenue measure is not to tell
corporate management what proportion of earnings they
shall distribute and what proportion they shall retain. The
object is, rather, to see that, whatever the decisions of cor-
porate managements, the Federal Government shall not be
unreasonably and inequitably deprived of necessary revenues.21
Moreover, Helvering contended that the proposal would not
threaten a corporate manager's ability to retain "a substantial
portion of its current earnings" as surplus. 18
Legislators were dubious of the claim that the tax was not
intended to interfere with corporate management and several
representatives attacked that point during the question-and-answer
213. Id. at 14.
214. Id. at 19.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 167-71.
216. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 22.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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period following Helvering's prepared statement. Representative
Frank Crowther of New York charitably called Helvering's
statement on the matter "naive," asking, "is it not a fact that under
what might be well termed 'pressure rates', we are, in a sense,
compelling corporations to distribute?"219 While Crowther's question
only evoked a feeble response from Helvering,22 ° a fellow New
Yorker, Representative Daniel Reed, made the more shrewd charge.
Reed suggested the undistributed profits tax proposal could be
traced to Rex Tugwell's earlier writings on a nationally planned
economy.221 Quoting from Tugwell's book, Industrial Discipline, in
which Tugwell wrote that "[t]he first step in control would be to ...
drive corporate surpluses into the open investment market," Reed
apparently hoped to stain the tax with the imprimatur of Tugwell's
radical attack on corporate management.222
The perceived threat the undistributed profits tax posed to the
independence of corporate managers permeated the testimony in
opposition to the bill. Most of the business leaders and their
representatives before the Ways and Means Committee raised
various essentially neutral arguments about the value of surplus
and planning and the uncertain revenue prospects of any change in
the corporate tax. Implicit in their testimony, however, was the view
that corporate managers and their boards of directors were much
better equipped to decide such issues than were Congress or
Treasury. One of the principal criticisms of the tax was that it
incorrectly blamed the existence of large corporate surpluses for the
economy's ills. Noel Sargent, secretary of the National Association
of Manufacturers, argued that retaining corporate profits produced
benefits ranging from increased stockholder value and industrial
employment from the expansion of plant operations to preserving
working capital and protecting against depression.22 Moreover,
because of its positive effect on a corporation's balance sheet, it was
219. Id. at 38.
220. Id. (statement of Guy Helvering, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service) ("Well, of
course, Mr. Crowther, that statement was occasioned to a certain extent by the continued
attack made as to the inability to create reserves.").
221. Id. at 42 (statement of Rep. Reed).
222. Id. After quoting liberally from the Industrial Discipline, Reed noted that "evidently
he ITugwell] is quite in harmony with this recommendation." Id.
223. Id. at 206-10 (statement of Noel Sargent, Secretary, National Association of
Manufacturers).
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called a necessity for securing alternative forms of financing such as
bond or equity issuances.22 Leslie Johnston, Pittsburgh's Director
of Public Works, even went so far as to suggest that corporate
surplus was a necessary hedge against natural disasters such as the
flood that had recently struck his city.2
2 5
A related concern was that the undistributed profits tax would
damage smaller corporations. According to the argument, the lack
of an accumulated surplus and an inability to secure reasonable
financing through the debt or equity markets forced small cor-
porations to "plow back" their earnings into the company. As the
president of a small bridge corporation testified, "[tihe smaller
companies have only grown by using their earned surplus in the
building of larger facilities and in increasing their working capital
the necessary amount to take care of the increased capacity."226 By
taxing each year's undistributed profits, the chairman of the tax
committee of the Illinois Manufacturing Association warned of the
"grave danger that the present highly capitalized organizations
will have a continuing advantage over these small corporations."227
Even representatives of the larger corporations acknowledged this
complaint's validity. Sargent noted that one "pretty good sized"
member of the National Association of Manufacturers expressed its
approval for the tax because "it would tend to drive out their weak
competitors."2m Notwithstanding the plausibility of such complaints,
the fact that most large corporations publicly opposed the tax
despite its apparent advantages left some congressmen suspicious
of their true motives.
2 29
224. Id. at 266.
225. Id. at 111 (statement of Leslie M. Johnston, Director of Public Works, City of
Pittsburgh, Pa.).
226. Id. at 146 (statement of Clyde G. Conley, President, Mount Vernon Bridge Company).
According to Conley, the company had an annual income of less than $24,000. Id. at 144.
227. Id. at 352 (statement of G.L. Walters, Illinois Manufacturing Association).
228. Id. at 251 (statement of Noel Sargent, Secretary, National Association of
Manufacturers).
229. Id. at 814 (statement of Rep. Hill). Representative Hill stated:
It strikes me as rather an unusual attitude for the large corporations to
take--out of purely altruistic motives, I assume-that this will work to the
detriment of the small corporations and that it will tend toward monopoly. I
cannot conceive that these strong corporations who like to monopolize the field
as far as they can are solicitous for the small corporations through the
imposition of a tax which they claim, or which it is claimed here, will work to
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As these congressmen probably surmised, businesses' underlying
concern was that the tax would interfere with the decisions of
corporate managers and boards of directors. G.L. Walters of the
Illinois Manufacturing Association explained that "[blusiness
corporation management must decide, with reference to the
particular situation of the particular business corporation at the
particular time, how much of its net income is required to be
retained for corporate purposes."23 Enacting an undistributed
profits tax, Walters complained, would "take from business
management one of the most essential matters of management
involved in business. Government would just as well take away from
all those who have the responsibility of driving automobiles their
control over the brakes, the clutch, the throttle, or the steering
wheel."231 Fred Clausen of the United States Chamber of Commerce
echoed these concerns, arguing that "[tihis proposal would cause
corporate management to be controlled, in its decisions on fiscal
policy, by fear of Government exactions rather than by good
business judgment." 2 Representative Fred Vinson concluded that
this was "the major objection that has been presented in these
hearings. " '
What appeared to scare corporate management the most, even
more than the prospect of government interference, was the
possibility such interference would pit managers against their
stockholders and creditors. Under the Revenue Act of 1935, in-
dividual surtax rates ranged from 27 to 75% while the corporate
income tax topped out at 15%.234 This rate differential helped align
management-stockholder interests toward the retention of corporate
profits. Since dividends would subject wealthy stockholders to the
high surtax rates, while a policy of non-distribution would allow the
profits to grow subject to substantially lower rates, stockholders
their advantage.
Id.
230. Id. at 338 (statement of G.L. Waiters, Illinois Manufacturing Association).
231. Id. at 339.
232. Id. at 737 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal
Finance, United States Chamber of Commerce).
233. Id. at 822 (statement of Rep. Vinson). E.C. Alvord of the United States Chamber of
Commerce agreed with Representative Vinson's statement. Id. (statement of E.C. Alvord,
United States Chamber of Commerce).
234. See Revenue Act of 1935, §§ 101-02, 49 Stat. at 1014-15.
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were more than happy to let managers retain corporate profits for
reinvestment in the business. The proposed tax, by contrast,
promised to narrow or eliminate this gap for most stockholders by
setting the maximum rate on undistributed profits at 42.5%.235 Fred
Clausen predicted:
[The tax] would engender such uncertainties concerning the
sound course to pursue as to subject the management to grave
difficulties with shareholders and creditors.... You can well
imagine the difficulties facing managers and the board of
directors in a company as to how to meet a situation which
would exist if this proposal becomes the law of the land. 6
According to Clausen, "[ilt presents the danger that corporate
management would be subject to serious criticism and even law
suits if liberal dividend policies were followed to escape taxes and
gave rise to charges of dissipation of assets."237 Probably more
frightening to managers was the corresponding danger that
stockholders would no longer permit them to pursue conservative
dividend policies geared toward building up cash for capital
expansion.
During their testimony, Treasury representatives attempted to
allay corporate managers' fears. Herman Oliphant emphasized:
[Ilt is not for anybody in Washington to tell business executives
how much of their earnings they shall keep back and how much
they shall distribute. That is not the Government's business....
But it is the Government's business to see to it that those
administering the affairs of a corporation shall not use it, nor
permit it to be used, for avoiding the surtaxes which everybody
else has to pay. That is what this does."5
235. See supra text accompanying note 209.
236. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 739-40 (statement of Fred H. Clausen,
Chairman of the Committee on Federal Finance, United States Chamber of Commerce).
237. Id. at 740.
238. Id. at 607 (statement of Herman Oliphant, General Counsel, Treasury Department).
The New York Times was clearly dubious of Oliphant's statement, asking:
If the proposed tax is not a tax designed to control the dividend policy of
corporations, one would like to know what it is.... Mr. Oliphant is saying to the
corporations in effect: "We are not trying in the slightest to influence your
dividend policy, but we will put a thumping tax on you if you don't pay out
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Officials backed up their claims by identifying two principal
mitigating factors. First, they pointed out that the tax would still
permit accumulation of a fairly significant surplus. Arthur Kent,
Acting Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, noted that
it "is continually overlooked that the measure will permit retention
of a substantial fraction ... without a corporate tax burden equal to
or in excess of the burden imposed by the present law."239 According
to Oliphant, corporations might be able to retain 20 and 30% of their
earnings without incurring a tax liability under the undistributed
profits tax in excess of their liability under the corporate income
tax.240 Second, Treasury officials suggested corporations could
satisfy their capital needs through other means. While debt and
equity financing were likely sources for the large corporations,
opponents complained that they were less accessible to the smaller
corporation.2 1 In response to such concerns, Kent cited a number of
alternative "financing" vehicles such as stock rights, taxable stock
dividends, and interest-bearing dividend script.4 2 Of these vehicles,
members of the committee were most interested in taxable stock
dividends. Kent explained that recent judicial decisions had
confirmed the possibility that a corporation could issue a type of
stock dividend that would be considered taxable to the stockholder,
but would permit the corporation to retain the underlying funds.2'3
Concerning one case, Koshland v. Helvering,2" which was then
everything, and let you off scot free from taxes if you do."
Editorial, The Ship and the Rats, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1936, at 22.
239. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 581 (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting
Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue).
240. Id. at 649 (statement of Herman Oliphant, General Counsel, Treasury Department);
see also id. at 582 (estimating that a corporation might be able to retain as a high as 40% of
earnings without exceeding its previous income tax liability).
241. See, e.g., id. at 761 (statement of Roy Osgood, United States Chamber of Commerce).
242. Id. at 582. In the case of some of these, such as stock dividends, they were not truly
financing vehicles in the sense of raising cash from outside investors or lenders. Kent was
suggesting that if a company viewed undistributed profits, or, in modern parlance, free cash
flow, as its only viable means of financing expansion or a new venture, then the company
could achieve the same result by keeping the profits and distributing taxable stock dividends.
See id.
243. Id. at 593. In 1935, for instance, the Sixth Circuit held that a dividend of common
stock to preferred stockholders constituted a taxable stock dividend because it meaningfully
changed the preferred stockholders'interest in the corporation. See Commissioner v. Tillotson
Mfg. Co., 76 F.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir. 1935).
244. 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
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pending at the Supreme Court, Kent predicted the decision likely
would recognize the possibility that a common stock dividend issued
to preferred stockholders could be found taxable.245 Furthermore,
Kent noted that a stock dividend with a cash option was already
considered taxable under Eisner v. Macomber"4 because it effec-
tively operated as a cash dividend followed by a purchase of the
distributing corporation's stock.24 7 Representative Vinson called the
taxable stock dividend idea "very interesting" and suggested that "it
will allay a major portion of the fear that some folks have that ... the
capital structure of a corporation would be in danger, or that
thereby it would not have the money for the rainy day."
248
Treasury's responses appeared sufficient to placate members of
the Ways and Means Committee as well as most other members of
the House. Despite opponents' urgings to proceed slowly before
pursuing such a "radical change" in the system of taxing corpo-
rate income,24 9 the undistributed profits tax emerged from the
Committee and quickly passed in the House with surprisingly little
dissent.2 0 Republicans did raise many of the same objections made
during the hearings before the Ways and Means Committee, 1 going
245. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 593 (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting
Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue).
246. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
247. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 593-94. In Eisner, the Court held that stock
dividends are not taxable, but conceded that "an actual cash dividend, with a real option to
the stockholder either to keep the money for his own or to reinvest it in new shares, would be
as far removed as possible from a true stock dividend .... "Eisner, 252 U.S. at 215 (1920).
248. 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 592 (statement of Rep. Vinson).
249. Id. at 857 (statement of John W. O'Leary, President, Machinery and Allied Products
Institute); see also id. at 841 (statement of Raymond H. Berry, Detroit Board of Commerce)
("I believe a tried system of taxation is much better than a new system of taxation, which to
me presents many difficulties.").
250. See $803,000,000 Tax Bill Wine by Vote of 267-93 in House; Business Attacks New
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1936, at 1; House Gets New Tax Bill, But Yield is Still in Doubt;
Quick Passage is Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1936, at 1 (noting that House Ways and
Means Committee voted fifteen to eight in favor of reporting the bill to the full House).
251. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 6081 (1936) (statement of Rep. Reed) (arguing for surplus to
repair "impaired capital" and rebuild businesses); id. at 6083 (statement of Rep. Reed)
(describing the tax as "a plan of industrial control contemporaneous with the inauguration
of the present administration and to be carried forward into capital allocation itself'); id. at
6085 (statement of Rep. Lamneck) (suggesting that the principle of the bill is to "attempt by
taxing methods to compel business institutions to follow our bidding"); id. at 6094 (statement
of Rep. Plumley) ("[Tihe small struggling corporation is strangled in its infancy;, the growing
and thrifty young business is anesthetized; the healthy and prosperous industry seeking to
expand and to develop is put to death by the lethal weapon concealed in this plan for its
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so far as to bombastically characterize the bill as "but a further
effort to regiment business under the Federal taxing power along
the lines proposed by that revolutionary-minded college professor,
'brain truster' extraordinary, exponent of planned economy, and
enemy of American ideals and institutions-Rexford G. Tugwell,"" 2
but their opposition was considered "perfunctory" and the chamber
called "indifferent" to their pleas. 3 At times, fewer than 10% of the
Representatives were present for the debates over the bill, and,
according to the New York Times, "not more than half [of those
present] were listening to the discussion."2"" Those debates about
the bill that did take place involved no more than a handful of
congressmen.2 55
Much of this apparent lack of interest was due to the
Republicans' decision to oppose the bill without offering any
alternatives. During a party caucus held while the bill was still
under consideration in the House, Republican leaders chose to
make "campaign material" out of the tax bill rather than attempt
to lessen its impact on business.256 According to the Minority
Leader, Representative Snell, "[tihere is only one amendment the
Republican side could offer and that would be to strike out the
enacting clause. The measure is not a question of raising taxes, but
a question of changing the policy that has been in vogue for the last
twenty years."25 7 The Republicans did nominally support a proposal
from Ohio Representative Arthur P. Lamneck, the lone Democrat
opponent of the bill on the Ways and Means Committee, to replace
the undistributed profits tax with a flat tax on corporate income at
a rate of 22.5%."' Otherwise, the Republicans limited themselves to
economic murder.").
252. 80 CONG. REc. 6300 (1936) (statement of Rep. Treadway).
253. See Turner Catledge, House Democrats Wind Up Tax Bill; Final Vote Today, N.Y.
TMS, Apr. 29, 1936, at 1 (calling the proceedings "the most perfunctory witnessed in the
House on an important measure in many years"); Editorial, On the Senate's Lap, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1936, at 18 ("After little debate worthy of the name, conducted for the most part
before an indifferent chamber whose seats were less than one-quarter filled [the House passed
the measure].").
254. Turner Catledge, Democrat Lines up with Tax Bill Foes in Attack in House, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1936, at 1; 80 CONG. Rac. 6009 (1936) (statement of Rep. Rich).
255. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 306.
256. See Republicans Bar Tax Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1936, at 12.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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voting against the bill as it emerged from Committee and avoided
a prolonged battle over amendments.
2. Senate
The Republican strategy in the House may have been prompted
in part by the belief that the Senate would provide a more receptive
audience for an attack on the bill.259 Opponents were initially
emboldened by reports that even the pro-Administration members
of the Senate Finance Committee were dissatisfied with the House
bill.2"o Although the overwhelming approval of the bill in the House
caused such optimism to waver, 261 most observers considered the bill
a likely target for revision if for no other reason than its enormous
complexity. 262 Nevertheless, the business community's outrage over
the House bill's passage may have led opponents to reconsider
whether they could afford to let the undistributed profits tax pass
in the Senate without amendment."3 While they still hoped to
persuade the majority that the entire idea should be scrapped,
opponents began a campaign to reduce the undistributed profits
tax's impact. By minimizing the bill's reliance on the tax, they
believed the rate could be reduced to an amount sufficient to force
259. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 307-08.
Most observers were convinced that the critical decisions would be made in the
Senate.... Senators practiced freer debate, listened to the public criticism, and
had an open mind. The House, on the other hand, disposed of public business in
a great rush and left it to the Senate to improve a measure.
Id.
260. See Alfred F. Flynn, Finane Committee Questions Tax Bill on Two Grounds, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 24, 1936, at 1.
261. See George B. Bryant, Jr., Tax Bill Speeded as Opposition Wanes in Senate, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 29, 1936, at 1; $803,000,000 Tax Bill Wins By Vote of 267-93 in House; Business
Attacks New Deal, supra note 250, at 1.
Because of the tremendous House majority in today's vote and the ease with
which the bill was shoved through the amending stages in that body yesterday,
prospective opposition in the Senate was felt to be cooling perceptibly.
Republican Senators indicated they might follow the lead of their House
colleagues and merely make their record against the whole new tax proposal,
without attempting to amend it.
Id.
262. See Muddle Over "Simplified" Tax Bill, 121 LITERARY DIG. 39 (1936).
263. See, e.g., Turner Catledge, Small Companies Fight Profit Tax; King Has New Plan,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 2, 1936, at 1; Chamber Speakers Assail Profits Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1936, at 10; Thrust at Tax Bill Winds Up Chamber, N.Y. TInES, May 1, 1936, at 1.
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corporate managers to increase dividend distributions. This, in
effect, would render it impotent as a method for government to exert
its control over corporations.
To reduce the bill's exclusive reliance on the undistributed
profits tax, opponents questioned its revenue-raising ability and
harped on its lack of a track record of success.2 Early in the
process, a majority of the Senate Finance Committee clearly was
sympathetic to both these concerns. According to the Wall Street
Journal, during the Committee's private deliberations on the bill,
"both Democratic and Republican members of the committee ...
bombarded treasury tax experts with questions regarding the
revenue feature."265 Such concerns spilled over into the public
hearings concerning the bill, as both Morgenthau and Helvering
continually fielded questions regarding Treasury's revenue pro-
jections.c6 Senator King, for example, asked Helvering: "[H]ow you
can reach any sort of definite and accurate conclusions as to what
tax would be obtained if all or approximately all the dividends had
been distributed, unless you know the brackets" of the individual
stockholders?267
Several witnesses emphasized the revenue issue in their
testimony. R.C. Fulbright of the Southern Pine Association pointed
out that "most of the very large corporations have already built up
reserves to conduct their business and follow the habitual policy of
distributing nearly all of their net income from year to year."2
Thus, according to Fulbright, they could not be counted on for the
necessary increase in revenues.2 9 This uncertainty captured the
essence of the problem for several witnesses. James Emery, general
counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers, said "lilt
is not ... a reliable source of revenue, for it is subject to the
264. See id.
265. Flynn, supra note 260, at 1. Another concern was that several of the provisions, most
notably relating to the separate classifications for debt-laden corporations, were
unconstitutional. See Senators Seek Ruling on Constitutionality of Profits Tax Bill, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 25, 1936, at 1.
266. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 1-28 (statements of Henry Morgenthau
Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, and Guy T. Helvering, Commissioner, Internal Revenue
Service).
267. Id. at 18.
268. Id. at 147 (statement of R. C. Fulbright, Southern Pine Association).
269. Id.
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variations of business policy rather than the net income of the
business itself."271 M.L. Seidman of the New York Board of Trade
summarized these concerns:
At a time like the present, when the need for revenue is so great,
when we are spending so much more than what we are taking
in, when business is recuperating from the worst depression in
our history, and when industry is so sensitive to every
disturbing influence, how can we possibly afford to gamble such
a vast sum of known, public revenue for what is so much an
adventure into the wilderness?271
The attacks on the bill's revenue estimates caused a significant
internal rift among Treasury officials. Morgenthau supported
the undistributed profits tax idea primarily because of its ability
to raise the necessary revenue. When that ability encountered
critical scrutiny, he made a quick retreat. On May 5, Morgenthau
reportedly told Oliphant:
You assumed the responsibility of the tax bill ... and I am willing
to rely on your judgment that you have it in hand. I place my
reputation in your hands. You have not abused it yet. However,
as people call various things to my attention, I will bring them
to you. We are gambling to the extent of $1,250,000,000 in
revenue and you fellows must be triply sure that you are right.
I leave it entirely to you and Haas.272
Treasury's technical staff was hardly up to the task set forth by
Morgenthau. In fact, George Haas, the head of Treasury's Division
270. Id. at 682 (statement of James A. Emery, General Counsel, National Association of
Manufacturers); see also id. at 221 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, United States Chamber of
Commerce) ("The added revenue to be derived is highly uncertain and insufficient. It is less
than the budgeted increase in ordinary expenditures for the next fiscal year.*).
271. Id. at 93 (statement of M.L. Seidman, Chairman, Tax Committee, New York Board
of Trade). This theme was also emphasized in the popular press:
Nobody knows how much revenue the bill would actually produce; it might be
less than the billion dollars obtainable by the present taxes, which the bill would
recklessly abolish.... If the things nobody knows about this bill were laid end to
end, they would constitute an aggregate of ignorance as enormous and
formidable as American statesmanship has ever been able to boast.
Taxing and Destroying, Bus. WEEK, May 9, 1936, at 48.
272. BLUM, supra note 142, at 311.
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of Research and Statistics, was said to be "virtually in tears at
the prospects of defending his estimates ... before the Finance
Committee."273 As Mark Leff recounted, Treasury's statistical
knowledge was "rudimentary" at best and Treasury witnesses
were "uninformed" about other countries' experiences with an
undistributed profits tax.27
By far the most staggering blow to Treasury came in the form of
testimony from former Treasury official George May, a senior
partner in the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse Company. May
found an error in the figures Treasury Secretary Morgenthau used
in his opening testimony before the Committee.275 Morgenthau
had claimed that more than $4.5 billion of corporate income would
be withheld from stockholders under existing law.276 According
to Morgenthau, if distributed this income would translate into
an additional $1.3 billion in income taxes from individual
stockholders.27 May pointed out, however, that the $4.5 billion
would only be available for distribution if the current corporate
taxes were repealed. 8 More than a billion dollars of that figure
would go directly to the Federal coffers under existing law, leading
May to suggest that this and other aspects of the Treasury
projections "artificially inflate[d] the estimate of increase of yield
from the new law" by ignoring the revenue already available under
the current corporate tax.279 May's testimony, which "administration
spokesman admitted was perhaps the most rational indictment yet
laid against the proposed undistributed corporate profits tax,"280
only highlighted the perils of pursuing a radical change in the
system of taxation. The New York Times responded by reprinting
the entire text of May's prepared statement and calling the
undistributed profits tax "a huge gamble."28 '
273. Id. at 314; LEFF, supra note 86, at 180.
274. LEFF, supra note 86, at 180.
275. 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 538 (statement of George 0. May, Price
Waterhouse Company).
276. Id. at 4 (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 538.
279. Id. at 539.
280. Turner Catledge, Tax Bill Unsound and Not Needed, Expert Testifies, N.Y. TIMES, May
7, 1936, at 1.
281. Statement on Taxes by George 0. May Before Senate Finance Committee, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1936, at 5; Editorial, A Huge Gamble, N.Y. TIMEs, May 8, 1936, at 22.
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These attacks served to reinforce the criticism that the tax was
just a thinly-veiled attempt to control corporate governance. A New
York Times editorial observed that "[lit has become increasingly
obvious that in the eyes of most of its sponsors the proposed tax on
corporation surpluses is not primarily a revenue measure, but a new
economic 'reform. 2 While this may not have been entirely
accurate, 283 corporate managers at least thought that the bill was
more about theories of proper corporate governance than about
raising revenue. Businessmen registered loud approval, for in-
stance, when the U.S. Chamber of Commerce adopted a resolution
at its annual meeting calling the undistributed profits tax an
attempt "to regulate the management of American corporations.' 2
As in the House, corporate managers were concerned that the tax
was intended to drive a wedge between themselves and their
stockholders. Herman Lind of the National Machine-Tool Builders
Association warned:
The determination of dividend policy within an individual
company will bring to the fore conflicts among various types of
stockholders. A very different interest in the amount of earnings
to be distributed will be found between stockholders of large
incomes and those of small incomes-between those engaged in
the management of a business and those who are purely
investors. 5
The result, H.W. Storey, the vice-president of the Allis Chalmers
Manufacturing Company, candidly admitted, is that "the normal
pressure on management by stockholders for the payment of larger
dividends" would grow, making it "more difficult for management to
pursue a conservative policy of utilizing a large proportion of its
earnings for the purpose of promoting the growth of the company."2
282. Editorial, Punishing Prudence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1936, at 22.
283. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 307 (Morgenthau interested in same); LAMBER, supra
note 106, at 277 (suggesting that FDR was primarily interested in raising revenue by
combating tax avoidance).
284. Felix Belair, Jr., Business and the New Deal Still FarApart, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1936,
§ IV, at 3; Thrust at TaxBill Winds Up Chamber, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1936, at 1.
285. 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 520 (statement of Herman H. Lind, National
Machine-Tool Builders Association).
286. Id. at 724 (statement of H.W. Storey, Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company).
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In effect, corporate managers would be precluded from pursuing the
policy of capital expansion that many favored.
With the momentum from May's testimony, a group of nine
Democrats on the Committee joined the Republican minority to
announce an alternate revenue proposal. 7 Under the proposal,
which was prepared with the substantial assistance of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and its representatives,2 the undistributed
profits tax would assume a greatly reduced role. In its place, the
Senators planned to raise the corporate income tax from its current
top rate of 15% to rates ranging from 17.5 to 20% and to eliminate
the exemption from the normal tax for dividends. 9 The un-
distributed profits tax would remain a part of the bill only as a
"temporary" tax for three years.' According to the Wall Street
Journal, the plan was an "outgrowth" of testimony "that the bill in
its present form will jeopardize assured revenue for an experiment
which may or may not produce more revenue than the existing law
provides.""1 Although the Senate Finance Committee was rumored
to have discussed such a proposal before formally considering the
bill,292 May's testimony appeared to be the final straw that led to the
announcement of the compromise plan.
Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall (or in the newspapers),293
Roosevelt announced that he was open to the Senate Finance
Committee's proposed changes to the original plan approved by the
House. 4 According to the New York Times, "The President was
287. See Senate Group Plans Complete Tax Bill Revision, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1936, at 1.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 260, at 1-2 ("Members of the [Senate Finance] committee
advanced suggestions that the bill might be changed so that the present corporation tax
structure would be retained, but supplemented with some taxes on excess profits or undivided
earnings."); Senate Will Modify Tax Bill, Bus. WEEK, May 2,1936, at 26 ("[S]uch retention [of
the corporate income tax) is still the best guess on Senate prospects.).
293. See, e.g., Turner Catledge, Senate Backers Waver on Roosevelt Tax Plan; Hard Fight
in Prospect, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1936, at 1; Bernard Kilgore, White House Lash Necessary to
Stop Tax Bill Revisions, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1936, at 1 ("As public hearings on the
Administration's 1936 tax program draw to a close, it is becoming increasingly evident that
President Roosevelt will have to turn on the heat' again to avoid drastic revision of the House
bill by the Senate.").
294. See Alfred F. Flynn, Roosevelt Held Willing to Have Tax Bill Changed, WALL ST. J.,
May 12, 1936, at 1 ('President Roosevelt is open to suggestions for changes in the House tax
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reported to have told [Senate Finance Committee Chairman]
Senator Harrison that he would approve this or any other
similar proposal if it promised to produce the needed revenue
and, at the same time, carried out the general philosophy of an
impost on undistributed corporate earnings."' 5 Roosevelt's willing-
ness to compromise was not surprising considering that both
Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and Bureau of Internal Revenue
Commissioner Helvering came to similar conclusions after listening
to the Senate Finance Committee Hearings.2" Announcing to his
staff his decision to pursue a compromise proposal, Morgenthau
stated that there were "too many dangers surrounding the
possibilities." 7 The most important purpose of the measure, he
reminded Oliphant, was to raise the necessary revenue.2 Mindful
of the election year, Roosevelt could not afford to ignore
Morgenthau's warnings.
Despite the general agreement that the tax bill's exclusive
reliance on the undistributed profits tax was untenable, there was
no consensus on what role, if any, the undistributed profits tax
should still play in any compromise bill. In addition to the proposal
to make the undistributed profits tax a mere temporary measure in
the revenue bill, one other proposal had garnered support from
members of the Senate Finance Committee. This proposal, which
a New York Times editorial first described and substantially
resembled proposals forwarded by the American Institute of
Accountants and the New York State Society of Certified Public
Accountants,2" sought to raise the necessary revenue while
bill, sources close to the White House made known Monday.").
295. Turner Catledge, Revised Tax Plan Offered With RooseveltIs Approval, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 1936, at 1; see also Catledge, supra note 293, at 1.
Some Senators said they had it on good authority that if a plan were evolved
which would promise the desired additional revenue and at the same time
maintain a vestige of the proposed levy on undistributed corporate profits, the
President would accept it gladly, rather than hazard a long session-end fight
with Congress in an election year.
Id.
296. See Turner Catledge, Senators Draw Up Compromise Plan on Profit Tax Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1936, at 1.
297. LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 325.
298. Id.
299. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 602 (statement of Victor H. Stempf,
Committee on Federal Taxation, American Institute of Accountants); Catledge, supra note
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appeasing Roosevelt's need for a symbolic undistributed profits tax.
Under the Times plan, the existing tax on corporate incomes would
be retained, but at a flat rate of 15% rather than the graduated
rates ranging from 12.5 to 15%."oo In addition, the proposed bill
would eliminate the exemption from the 4% normal tax on dividends
paid to individuals and would impose a 4% undistributed profits
tax.
30
The identity of rates between the dividend tax and the
undistributed profits tax was no mere coincidence. As the New York
Times acknowledged, "Such a tax should raise substantial revenue
at the same time as it would be likely to have very little effect on
dividend policy, for it would penalize even the relatively low-
incomed stockholders no more to retain these profits than to pay
them out."302 Although it was true that undistributed profits would
be subject to the individual normal and surtax rates if distributed
in a subsequent year, a company that never or rarely issued
dividends would avoid shareholder pressure to do so now. The
Times also suggested raising the 4% undistributed profits tax for
retentions above a threshold "normal" dividend policy, with a
notable exception for retentions ear-marked for "the purchase of
new machinery, the building of added plants or the creation of
tangible facilities," as a method of limiting tax avoidance. 3 Senator
King was so favorably impressed by the plan that he had the
editorial entered into the record during the Hearings."'
The Times proposal pushed Roosevelt to the limits of his
willingness to compromise, and beyond. His principal complaint-
that the proposal would not force a corporation to increase its
dividend distributions because the undistributed profits tax was
identical to the dividend tax on distributions-was the greatest
196, at 1; Editorial, A Compromise Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1936, at 18; Long Tie-Up
Looms on Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1936, at 1, 32.
300. A Compromise Tax Bill, supra note 299, at 18.
301. Id. The American Institute of Accountants simply suggested that the undistributed
profits tax be applied at a "low rate." 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 603.
302. A Compromise Tax Bill, supra note 299, at 18.
303. Id.
304. See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 352 (statement of Sen. King) (I should
like to insert in the record an editorial that the New York Times has in this morning's issue,
a very excellent editorial, and by that I do not mean to give my approval to it in all respects,
as to the terms of a bill.").
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virtue in the eyes of the proposal's supporters. 5 He did not have the
requisite Committee support, however, to dictate the terms of a
compromise. Even after Senator Harrison appeared to steer the
Committee toward a proposal that would raise the normal tax
from 4 to 5% and set the undistributed profits tax at a modestly
higher 7%,3" corporate managers protested. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce issued a statement denouncing Harrison's proposed
alternative.0 7 According to the Chamber, even "[t]he introduction of
that principle [the undistributed profits tax] into our tax system in
any form whatever is opposed by business on the justifiable ground,
among others, that it would inject government into the management
of private enterprise."  Another Democrat on the Committee,
Senator George, countered with a plan to remove any pressure on
management to distribute profits by tying the normal and
undistributed profits taxes at an identical rate of 5%.3' Although a
majority of the members of the Committee expressed approval for
George's plan to tie the undistributed profits tax to the normal tax
rate,310 Harrison eventually engineered a compromise that kept the
normal tax on dividends at 4% while levying a 7% undistributed
profits tax.311
Notwithstanding the re-emergence of an undistributed profits
tax that exceeded the normal tax on dividends, conservative forces
claimed victory. The spread between the undistributed profits tax
rate and the normal tax rate on dividends was too small to influence
the distribution of dividends. As the Wall Street Journal observed,
"the Senate committee has all but eliminated the tax pressure
calculated to force corporations to pay out earnings liberally in
305. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 327.
306. 18% Corporate, 5% Normal Tax New Senate Plan, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1936, at 1; see
Turner Catledge, Rise in Income Tax to 5%, 18% rate on Corporations, Now Favored By
Senators, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1936, at 1.
307. See Turner Catledge, New Tax Program is Held Adequate by the Treasury, N.Y. TIMS,
May 17, 1936, at 1.
308. Id. The primary risk of accepting the principle, even with rates too low to force the
distribution of profits, was that those rates could be adjusted in future years to accomplish
that very thing. Id.
309. Retained Profit Tax May Be Cut to Five Per Cent, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1936, at 3.
310. 12 of Senate Group Oppose Supertax Above Normal Rate, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1936,
at2.
311. See Turner Catledge, 18% Corporate Income Tax and 7% on Undivided Profit Agreed
on by Senate Group, N.Y. TIMS, May 22, 1936, at 1.
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dividends by trimming the pressure rate down to a flat 7 per cent on
all retained income." 12 The New York Times concluded that the
compromise "struck from the original plan the elements of economic
reform which at the outset were its main prop." " The Nation called
for "some stronger dynamite than a straight 7 per cent tax ... to
blast" out the undistributed profits. 1' During a conference with
Democrats on the Senate Finance Committee, Roosevelt expressed
his displeasure with the proposed bill."1 He urged them to set a
much higher tax on undistributed profits, with rates ranging from
as low as 25% to as high as 45%,31 but to no avail.17 The decision
was made to quickly push the bill through the Senate so that it
could go to the Conference Committee, where the administration's
prospects for success were brighter.318
The price corporate managers paid for gutting the bill of its
coercive power over dividend policy was the introduction of full
double taxation of corporate profits. Because of Roosevelt's demands
for increased revenue, the Finance Committee could not effect a
312. Editorial, Taxes Must Be Disguised, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1936, at 6.
313. Catledge, supra note 311, at 6; see also Editorial, Taxes Must Be Disguised, WALL ST.
J., May 26, 1936, at 6 (*The committee recognizes the grave danger of such an enactment but
feels compelled by party loyalty to accord the President a minor fraction of the project of social
reform through taxation which he espoused.*).
314. The Shape of Things, 144 NATION 725 (1936).
315. Roosevelt's displeasure was in part due to the realization that the Senate Finance
Committee compromise proposal might come up short in raising the necessary revenue. See
Arthur Krock, Shortage of Revenue Upset Senators' Tax Program, N.Y. TIM, May 28,1936,
at 22.
316. See Turner Catledge, Roosevelt Demands Return to His Original Tax Plan; Rejects
Senate Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1936, at 1; Alfred F. Flynn, Finance Members Fight
Roosevelt Tax Suggestions, WALL ST. J., May 28,1936, at 2; Editorial, Going to the Mat?, WALL
ST. J., May 28, 1936, at 4.
317. See Turner Catledge, Tax Plan Revision Barred in Senate to Wind Up Session, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1936, at 1.
In a desperate attempt to save their plan for adjournment of Congress by June
6, Democratic leaders decided today to rush the Finance Committee's
compromise revenue bill to the Senate floor, despite the objections of President
Roosevelt to its failure to meet demands for revenue and corporate tax reform
outlined by him in his message of March 3.
Id.
318. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 317; Senate Group Rushes Action on Tax Bill; To Vote
Own Plan, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1936, at 1 (reporting that Vice President John Nance Garner
was the principal proponent of this move among administration officials). Garner reportedly
believed "that tax bills are always written in conference anyway and that it is just so much
waste of time for one or the other bodies of Congress to get worked up over principles." Id.
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drastic reduction of the undistributed profits tax without re-
taining the corporate income tax. Although business leaders
advocated a program of slashing expenditures rather than raising
taxes, most recognized that this was unlikely, especially all at once
during an election year."i By coupling a corporate income tax with
a dividend tax to negate the undistributed profits tax, corporate
profits would be subject to double taxation even if they were
immediately distributed. Far from being an unintentional con-
sequence of legislative maneuvering, 2 ° double taxation emerged as
part of a trade off for corporate managers.
Despite nominal protests about this introduction of double
taxation,321' business representatives appeared willing to accept it if
the alternative was government interference with corporate
management. Many of the corporate managers testifying before the
Senate Finance Committee agreed that retaining the corporate
income tax, even at a higher rate, was preferable to the un-
distributed profits tax as long as individuals bore some of the
burden as well. The secretary and comptroller of one company, when
asked to opine on a variant of the New York Times' plan favored by
319. See Editorial, A Compromise Tax Bill, supra note 299, at 18.
320. See Kwall, supra note 3, at 619-20 (describing the origins of double taxation as
"inadvertent"). Kwall is probably correct in his assessment when viewed from Roosevelt's
perspective since the original bill in the House would not have imposed full double taxation.
For opponents of the bill, both in the Senate and in business, double taxation was adopted
with eyes wide open.
On the other hand, one contemporary observer suggested that it was to some extent
inadvertent on the part of business as well.
With what may be regarded as an excess of zeal, the critics insisted both that
the new tax would cripple corporations and that it would bring in a
disappointingly small revenue. Hence they argued the Government could not
afford to give up the time-tried corporation tax for this new experiment.
Congress, being impressed by the latter argument, compromised by retaining
the old taxes, imposing the new one as well, and abolishing the time-honored
exemption of dividends from normal tax. In this case business seems to have
talked itself into a higher tax bill.
Benjamin Graham, The Undistributed Profits Tax and the Investor, 46 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1936).
This argument ignores the opponents' two-part strategy against the tax. While the result
might be viewed as ironic from the perspective of their strategy to oppose the undistributed
profits tax altogether, it was consistent with their alternative strategy to minimize the
reliance on the undistributed profits tax as much as possible.
321. See Catledge, supra note 307, at 1 (describing a United States Chamber of Commerce
statement in which it listed fourteenth among its sixteen objections to the Senate Finance
Committee proposal that "[i]t would subject corporate earnings to double taxation").
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Senator King, stated, "I believe the businessman today would favor
an increased tax rate. I believe that the individual paying the
normal tax also should have his tax raised. I believe the tax
should be passed along to everyone.""'2 Arthur Ballantine, Under
Secretary of the Treasury in the Hoover Administration and the
representative of the Merchants Association of New York, similarly
stated:
I would rather see some reasonable increase in the corporation
rate which would not bring the hazards that I have been
speaking about. I want to say that I do not think you have
reason to get all of the additional revenue that you are speaking
of here, from the same source. You have not got to turn simply
to increasing the flat corporation rates, for example. You can
turn to a combination of that with increases in the income tax.s23
When pressed by Senator Connally to consider the possibility of a
20% tax on corporate income plus a 10 to 15% levy on undistributed
profits, Noel Sargent of the National Association of Manufacturers
responded by saying "the better procedure would be to increase the
present corporation income tax and not to levy any superimposed
tax on undistributed profits."32' Business leaders and their
representatives clearly advocated doing whatever was necessary to
reduce the impact of the undistributed profits tax on corporate
management. They believed that introducing double taxation
through the retention of the corporate income tax and removing the
exemption from the normal tax for dividends was a reasonable price
to pay for accomplishing that objective.
Through a minority report on the Finance Committee's com-
promise plan, Senators Hugo Black and Robert La Follette' Jr., fired
the last arrows in defense of a large undistributed profits tax.3 25 The
report's principal complaint was that the compromise proposal
322. 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 143 (statement of Paul Wilson, Graton &
Knight Company).
323. Id. at 429 (statement of Arthur A. Ballantine, Merchants Association of New York).
324. Id. at 675 (statement of Noel Sargent, Economist, National Association of
Manufacturers).
325. See Committee Minority Report Opposing Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 1936, at 22
(reprinting the minority report in its entirety).
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would do nothing for the problem of unnecessary retention of
earnings:
While the corporation would be subject to an increased tax of 7
per cent on undistributed profits, it is also true that the
committee's bill adds 4 per cent on the normal tax of the
individual where these dividends are distributed to the
individual stockholders. This means that if all the corporate
profits should be distributed the corporation would not pay the
7 per cent penalty but the individual would pay a 4 per cent tax
on the dividends.
The net incentive, therefore, is a 3 per cent tax on
undistributed profits. Such a penalty will not cause the
controlling group in the higher income tax brackets to declare
dividends 326
The report suggested retaining the corporate income tax while
imposing rates as high as 30% on undistributed profits in excess of
a certain amount, with generous exemptions for smaller businesses
and for normal retentions. 27 As the minority report explained, "the
committee's bill perpetuates the evils of a tax system under which
the largest income beneficiaries in America avoid their fair
proportion of tax."3
While the Senate considered the bill, members of the Finance
Committee made clear that their intent was to use the tax on
dividends to nullify the effects of the undistributed profits tax.
According to Senator Walter George, the committee vote was twelve
to four in favor of setting the undistributed profits tax at a rate no
higher than the normal rate on dividends.329 Only "after an earnest
appeal by the chairman"330 did the committee agree to raise the
undistributed profits to the rate of 7% and even then it was "to
arrive at an agreement" rather than to risk having the entire
matter decided on the Senate floor. 331 Thus, the proponents of the
compromise bill did not hide from, but instead embraced the fact
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. 80 CONG. REc. 8809 (1936) (statement of Sen. George).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 8803.
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that the dividends tax was being used as a foil for the undistributed
profits tax's push to distribute excess profits. In their eyes, double
taxation was a necessary tool in the fight to protect the retention
of profits where, "as a matter ofjudgment and of sound business, it
is of actual profit in the administration of the corporations to do
so. ""2 By reporting their desire to link the dividends tax to the
undistributed profits tax, the Finance Committee members signaled
their opposition to governmental interference with the management
of corporate enterprises. Although business groups continued to
protest the adoption of the undistributed profits tax in any form,
s33
they acknowledged the Senate bill's superiority to the House bill.34
3. Conference
After passing the Senate, 35 the bill proceeded to the conference
committee where it was deadlocked between the radically different
House and Senate versions. House conferees refused to budge from
their demands for a graduated undistributed profits tax and Senate
conferees insisted on retaining the corporate income tax."6 During
this impasse, corporate managers took their case directly to their
shareholders. Alfred Sloan, President of General Motors, sent a
letter to shareholders with the regular quarterly dividend warning
that it "would be little short of a catastrophe" for the government to
interfere with "the employment of accumulated profits by aggressive
and intelligent management."37 Most proponents of the Senate bill,
however, recognized that a compromise was likely and could only
332. Id. at 8804.
333. The National Association of Manufacturers issued a statement declaring:
Both the Senate Finance Committee and House bills accept the principle of
taxation of undistributed profits. Such a proposal is economically unsound, since
it repudiates the policy of industrial reinvestment of earnings upon which
expansion and employment have been based for over 100 years, and because it
seeks to substitute government judgment as to the desirable amount of
corporate reserves for that of directors elected by corporation stockholders.
Heated Debate on Taxes Forces Recess in Senate; Rise in Surtaxes Voted, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
1936, at 1 (quoting the National Association of Manufacturers).
334. Id.
335. See Tax Bill is Passed by Senate, 38 to 24; Conference to Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1936,
at 1.
336. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 343.
337. Decreed Dividends Opposed By Sloan, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 1936, at 33.
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result in a higher undistributed profits tax.33 ' These proponents,
nevertheless, sought to persuade the Senate conferees to mitigate
the damage. A New York Times editorial, for example, suggested
that any concessions toward a higher rate should include an
exemption for "all profits retained for the explicit purpose of buying
new machinery, making extensions of plant or otherwise adding to
the facilities."3 9 Such an exemption would effectively leave
businesses with the freedom to do most of what they had done
before with retained surplus.
With the assistance ofMorgenthau," the deadlock was resolved.
He convinced Ways and Means Chair Robert Doughton that they
had to retain the corporate income tax in the bill, telling him "I feel
that at this stage that we can't just throw all that overboard.3 41
With that compromise, the Senate conferees were more amenable
to a higher undistributed profits tax. This should not have been
surprising given that the harshest critics of the House bill among
the senators originally chosen for the conference committee-
Senators Couzens and Keyes-declined the appointments because
they would be unable to recommend any possible compromise. 42 The
only hard-line opponents of the undistributed profits tax on the
Senate conference committee were Senators Walsh and George,
and they dissented from the final agreement.3 4' Despite the pro-
Administration slant of the Senate conferees, the graduated
undistributed profits tax rates eventually agreed upon, with rates
ranging from 7 to 27%,'" still were considered "less severe" than the
rates proposed by Treasury or the House bill.34 The top rate on the
338. See Editorial, Tax Bill Compromise, N.Y. TIMEs, June 9,1936, at 22 ("Undoubtedly the
Senate conference committee will now be under great pressure, not merely from the House
committee but from some of its own members, to compromise with the House measure.").
339. Id.
340. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 318.
341. Id.
342. See Tax Bill is Passed by Senate, 38 to 24, supra note 335, at 1.
343. See 80 CONG. REc. 10163 (1936) (reprinting minority report filed by Senators George
and Walsh); Congress Ready To Enact the Compromise Tax Bill and Adjourn Tomorrow, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1936, at 1.
344. Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1648.
345. See Brownlee, supra note 123, at 54. In their minority report to the House conference
report on the bill, Senators Treadway, Crowther, and Woodruff acknowledged that the
primary difference between the final bill and the House bill was "in the degree of pressure'
exerted" by the undistributed profits tax rates. 80 CONG. REC. 10,263 (1936) (reprinting
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undistributed profits tax was identical to the lowest surtax rate for
incomes in excess of $44,000.3 This may have been designed to
subject corporate income to the same tax-whether it was retained
or distributed-assuming the shareholder's income fell within this
surtax bracket. Application of the 4% dividend tax, therefore,
ensured that it was still logical for those shareholders to permit the
corporation to retain profits rather than subject them to an
additional tax.347 Only those shareholders not subject to any surtax
-who were presumably the least powerful equity holders-were
still likely to clamor for distributions as a result of the ultimately
enacted undistributed profits tax.
As finally adopted, the Revenue Act of 1936 imposed a surtax on
the "undistributed net income" of corporations at rates ranging from
7 to 27%."' "Undistributed net income" was determined by
deducting from the adjusted net income 3 9 dividends paid during
the taxable year and amounts due to contracts that restricted
the payment of dividends. 3 0 An additional deduction was provided
for corporations with an adjusted net income below $50,000.351
Moreover, a number of corporations-most notably banks, in-
surance corporations, foreign corporations, and corporations in
bankruptcy-were exempt from the tax altogether.352 In addition to
imposing this surtax on undistributed profits, the 1936 Act retained
the normal corporate income tax, with rates ranging from 8 to
15%,313 and removed the exemption from the 4% normal individual
tax for dividends received. 54 Thus, for the first time in the history
of the income tax, corporate income was fully subject to double
taxation.
minority report of Republican House conferees).
346. See Revenue Act of 1935, § 101, 49 Stat. 1014 (1935) (both were set at 27%).
347. Of course, if the corporation retained the profits and became subject to the tax, the
shareholder would eventually be subject to a heavy tax upon distribution. If no distribution
was ever made, however, the shareholder could recoup his profits in the form of capital gains
upon sale of the stock.
348. Revenue Act of 1936, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656.
349. Id. § 14(a)(1), 49 Stat. at 1655. "Adjusted net income" was further defined as the net
income less the normal corporation tax and interest on U.S. obligations. Id.
350. Id. §§ 26(c), 27, 49 Stat. at 1664-65.
351. Id. § 14(c), 49 Stat. at 1656.
352. Id. § 14(d), 49 Stat. at 1656.
353. Id. § 13(b), 49 Stat. at 1655.
354. Id. § 11, 49 Stat. at 1653.
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C. The Rise and Fall of the Undistributed Profits Tax
1. The Aftermath of the Revenue Act of 1936
While legal scholars hurried to analyze the technical details of
the Revenue Act of 1936 and its "hastily drawn" undistributed
profits tax,355 business opposition to the undistributed profits
tax did not subside. According to Alfred Buehler, national and
regional business associations "continued to direct broadsides of
criticism against the measure because of its alleged complexities,
inequalities, and unfortunate effects on corporations."3  John
Morton Blum recounted that "[because that tax tended to return
to stockholders the decision about how to spend or invest their
money, it challenged the power of professional managers of large
corporations. These managers, their lawyers, and accountants, in
all an able, articulate, and influential group, were aggressive
opponents of the tax." 37 Republicans also helped sustain opposition
by highlighting it during the 1936 election campaign as an example
of the administration's anti-business stance.35 Alf Landon, the
Republican candidate for president, vowed to eliminate "this vicious
method of taxation," calling the undistributed profits tax "the
most cockeyed piece of tax legislation ever imposed in a modern
country."359
While continuing their public attack on the undistributed profits
tax, corporate managers were also attempting to learn to live with
355. Homer Hendricks, The Surtax on Undistributed Profits of Corporations, 46 YALE L.J.
19, 19 (1936); see Graham, supra note 320, at 1; Martin, supra note 85, at 44; Note, The
Corporate Undistributed Profits Tax, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1936); Note, The Surtax on
Undistributed Profits, 50 HARV. L. REv. 332 (1936).
356. BUEHLER, supra note 86, at 35; see LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 409 ("Business
representatives continued to complain that the law impaired the financial strength of
corporations, imposed unreasonable penalties upon expansion, and retarded economic
recovery. Business executives, lawyers, and economists gloomily predicted that the levy on
undivided corporate surpluses would lead to industrial stagnation, increased unemployment,
and a financial collapse."). For a typical expression of such sentiments, see Executives Sound
Confident Keynote, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 1937, at 55 (year-end statement of W.G. Carey,
President of Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company, assailing undistributed profit tax).
357. BLUM, supra note 142, at 321.
358. Id. at 319; HAWLEY, supra note 128, at 356.
359. Alf M. Landon, Federal and Family Finances, in 2 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 763,
764(1936).
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it. One significant change attributed to the enactment of the new
tax was a noticeable increase in dividend distributions as businesses
attempted to take advantage of the dividends-paid credit.3 ° This
was particularly evident during year-end when companies were
beginning to adjust to the new tax. Dividend payments in October
were the largest for that month since 1931 and dividends in
November set a record for any one month period, beating the old
record set in December of 1930 by almost $250 million.31' The year-
end surge in dividend declarations was so great that it threatened
to overwhelm the New York Stock Exchange's ability to register the
payments.362 Even after the turn of the year, however, dividend
listings continued to rise. In February 1937, for instance, dividends
increased by almost one-third over the previous year, with many
of the announcements labeling the distributions as 'interim' or
'irregular' to indicate that they were prompted by the undistributed
profits tax.' Although some observers later claimed that these
merely represented accelerated distributions or were the result
of a prosperous year,36 most commentators agreed that the
360. See GEORGE E. LENT, THE IMPACT OF THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAx 1936-1937, at
33 (1948) (concluding that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for an increase of
dividends by one-third); E.J.H., Jr., Some Economic Aspects of the Surtax on Undistributed
Profits of Corporations, 25 GEO. L.J. 423, 435 (1937).
During the last few weeks of 1936 announcements have been made of extra
dividends, of bonuses, and of wage increases, running into millions of dollars.
Each day brings announcement of further actions of this character, and when
the statistics are finally compiled for the calendar year 1936, the total of these
disbursements will probably reach, if not pass, the half billion mark.
Id.
361. Month's Dividends Put At $800,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1936, § 3, at 1 (noting
that dividends were $800 million versus $567 million in December of 1930); October Dividends
Largest Since 1931, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1936, § 3, at 1; $7,500,000 is Added to Dividend Total,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1936, § 3, at 1.
362. Exchange Eases Transfer Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1936, at 25.
363. Dividend Listings Rose in February, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1937, § 3, at 6. This may
have been due in part to the desire to manage investor expectations and rebut labor demands
for higher wages. See A.F. of L Demands Large Wage Rises on Recurring Basis, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1936, at 1 (demonstrating the ability to pay the wage increases by "pointing to what
it said were record dividend payments this month").
364. See Francis McIntyre, The Effect of the Undistributed Profits Tax Upon the
Distribution of Corporate Earnings - A Statistical Appraisal, 7 ECONOMETRICA 336, 347-48
(1939). The dividends were accelerated because the Treasury took the position that the
dividends-paid credit would only be available if the dividend checks were actually received by
shareholders before the end of the taxable year. See T.D. 4674, Art. 27-1(b), 33 Treas. Dec. Int.
Rev. 480, 492 (1936). For a contrary view, see Harry G. Guthmann, The Effect of the
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undistributed profits tax played a significant role. According to a
New York Times editorial:
The unparalleled distribution of dividends at the end of last year
was only in part the result of returning prosperity; the
distribution would never have been as large as it was had it not
been for the pressure on corporations to escape a heavy tax
penalty for the retention of earnings.""5
In a study of 360 corporation executives by the National Industrial
Conference Board, 61% of respondents indicated that their
company's dividend policies were affected by the undistributed
profits tax.3"
Even the change in dividend policies was simply another
opportunity for corporate managers to assail the tax publicly. The
National Association of Manufacturers spearheaded a campaign to
send letters to shareholders explaining that a desire to avoid
the undistributed profits tax, and not the exercise of business
judgment, forced the extra dividends." 7 In one example, a
prominent oil company declared a special dividend with an
accompanying explanation stating:
This special dividend declaration is made in order to reduce
the company's liability for the new Federal tax on undistributed
earnings. Because of the company's needs for capital expend-
itures and debt payments, the directors would prefer to retain in
the business the cash represented by this special dividend. In
any event, they would not ordinarily declare any dividend at this
time with respect to earnings for the present calendar year, as
such earnings cannot be known with sufficient exactness in the
usual course of business for some time after year's end.'
Undistributed Profits Tax upon the Distribution of Corporate Earnings: A Note, 8
ECONOMETRICA 354,356 (1940).
365. Editorial, The Surplus Tax, N.Y. TIMS, Jan. 5, 1937, at 22.
366. Lewis H. Kimmel, Experience Under the Undistributed Profits Tax, 11 CONF. BOARD
BuLL. 105, 106 (1937).
367. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 249 (noting the advent of "NAM sponsored shareholder
letters in 1936").
368. M.L. Seidman, The Stockholder Holds the Bag, 59 MAG. WALL ST. 156, 157 (1936). For
other examples, see Profits-Tax Levy Avoided By Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1937, at 31
('Distribution of extra and special dividends before the end of 1936 enabled Supervised
Shares, Inc., to avoid liabilities under the tax on undistributed profits, Merrill Griswold,
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Similar statements accompanied announcements of other
changes necessitated by the undistributed profits tax. For example,
the president of a public electric company explained that the
directors voted in favor of a stock split with a reduction in stated par
value because the tax would potentially interfere with plans for
capital expenditures,369 and a steel corporation executive sent a
letter to stockholders blaming the undistributed profits tax "for
abandoning its old policy of financing expansion and improvements
out of earnings."3 0
Some managers sought to avoid distributing profits by resorting
to taxable stock dividends. Under the 1936 Act, corporations were
entitled to a credit for distributions of taxable dividends, even if
they were paid in the form of stock rather than cash.371 A taxable
dividend consisted of a distribution that effected a meaningful
change in the shareholders' ownership of the corporation. A Dun &
Bradstreet Survey indicated that while 86% of the dividends
declared in 1936 were paid in cash3 2 an increasing number of
managers, especially in small and medium-sized corporations, were
strongly considering using alternatives to cash dividends in 1937."7'
Despite their appeal to managers, taxable stock dividends never
became a widely used solution to the undistributed profits tax
problem. Less than 113 of 1% of all corporations subject to the tax
decided to issue taxable stock dividends.37' Part of the problem was
the legal uncertainty surrounding the taxation of stock dividends. 7 '
As Arthur Kent had predicted during the House Ways and
Means Committee hearings on the 1936 Act, 76 the Supreme Court
eventually ruled in Koshland that common stock dividends
issued to preferred stockholders were taxable.377 Nevertheless, the
taxability of other types of stock dividends was still an open
Chairman, and Mahlon E. Traylor, President, said in a quarterly report issued yesterday.").
369. See Will Balance Effect of Federal Surtax, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1937, at 23.
370. Financing Planned by Ludlum Steel, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1937, at 31.
371. Revenue Act of 1936, § 27(e), 49 Stat. 1665.
372. See Willard L. Thorp & Edwin B. George, An Appraisal of the Undistributed Pro/its
Tax, DUN'S REV., Sept. 1937, at 5, 11.
373. Id. at 10 (Table I), 12.
374. Christie & Nanda, supra note 16, at 1753 n.19.
375. See Godfrey N. Nelson, Law Still is Hazy on Stock Dividends, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1,
1936, § 3, at 1.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 244-45.
377. Koshland, 298 U.S. at 447.
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question. A recent Board of Tax Appeals opinion added to the
uncertainty by ruling that a dividend in preferred stock on common
stock would not be taxable.37 Moreover, with the simplicity of many
corporations' capital structures, there were few aVailable avenues
other than the cash option dividend.3 79 This, however, would have
charged shareholders rather than managers with the reinvestment
decision, a result clearly unacceptable to business leaders."
A significant percentage of corporate managers chose to incur
the undistributed profits tax rather than increase their dividend
distributions.381 According to one recent study, between 17 and 23%
of small to medium-sized corporations paid marginal rates under
the undistributed profits tax of 22% or more and the total collections
under the tax reached $176 million in 1936 and $176 million in
1937.3"2 The study concluded: "While it is true that the vast majority
of firms increased dividend payout rates in 1936 to limit their tax
liability under the new law, a substantial number of firms paid high
marginal SUP [Surtax on Undistributed Profits] rates, and the
revenue from the new tax was large."' Not surprisingly, those
corporations that had retained the largest percentage of earnings
prior to the enactment of the undistributed profits tax continued to
retain the most-almost 50% of their free cash flow by one
378. See J.S. Seidman, Corporate Dividend Policies During the Rest of 1936 Under the New
Tax Law, 48 ANNAuST 671, 672 (1936).
379. COMMITrF. ON TAXATION OF THE TwENTmrn CENTURY FUND, INc., FACING THE TAX
PROBLEM 175-76 (1937); LENT, supra note 360, at 180. Even the taxability of the cash option
dividend was potentially called into question if all of the stockholders elected to take stock
rather than cash. See Norman L. McLaren, Management of Capital Distributions Under the
Revenue Act of 1936, 62 J. AccT. 334, 347.
380. This fear was expressed during the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee,
and Treasury's George Haas responded that the argument against cash-option dividends
assumes that corporate managements may justly reinvest earnings in a
particular enterprise against the desire of the stockholders .... Insofar as one
effect of the proposed change will be to encourage corporate managements to
obtain the consent of their stockholders for capital expansion, and to give to
stockholders, the real owners of the corporation, a greater control over the
disposition of their earnings, this effect is altogether desirable.
1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 138, at 52 (statement of Mr. Haas).
381. See, e.g., Many Companies Will Pay Surtax to Conserve Cash, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
1937, at 1 (citing companies such as American Gas & Electric, Distillers Corporation-
Seagrams Limited, Schenley Distillers Corporation, Chrysler Corporation, Douglas Aircraft,
and Skelly Oil Company).
382. CALOMnRS & HUBBARD, supra note 16, at 6-7.
383. Id.
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estimate-notwithstanding their increase in dividends. ' Moreover,
those corporations in growing industries with the highest external
finance costs-and thus the greatest need to retain earnings to fund
expansion projects and other needs-paid the highest rates under
the tax.s
2. 1937 Economic Downturn
In the spring of 1937, business leaders recognized they had little
hope of outright repeal of the undistributed profits tax,3 so they
focused on the more realistic goal of revising the undistributed
profits tax to remedy obvious inequities and inefficiencies.8 7
Coincidentally, the movement for revision lost steam when it
became clear that Treasury faced a revenue shortfall of $300 million
or more for the fiscal year.' Spurred on in part by the revelations
in the government's long-running audit of former Treasury
384. See Christie & Nanda, supra note 16, at 1744.
385. See CALOMIRS & HUBBARD, supra note 16, at 23.
386. See Seeks Data on Profits Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1937, at 8 (*'While there appears
to be little likelihood of the immediate elimination of the surtax on undistributed corporate
earnings,' the [United States Chamber of Commerce] wrote, 'there apparently is a growing
interest in official quarters in illustrations of substantial hardships and inequities
attributable to the tax.').
387. See 7 Changes Urged in Tax on Surplus, N.Y. TIzs Apr. 12, 1937, at 6 (report of a
committee of the Boston Chamber of Commerce); Sibley Asks Slash in Tax on Business, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1937, at 16 (United States Chamber of Commerce President urges exemption
for retentions of 30% or less.). Many members of Congress shared this sentiment:
Doughton noted that, as with any new tax law, it is usually necessary to amend
a tax law after the problems of administration have been determined. There is
some demand to revise the corporate surplus tax to take care of weak companies
and those with heavy indebtedness. It's a little early yet to talk about that, but
you can say that the road has not been closed by the committee.
New Tax Unlikely, Doughton Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1937, at 8; see also Excess Profits
Tax Revision Favored by Rep. Doughton, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1937, at 3 (reporting that Chair
of Ways and Means expresses "[hlope that the undistributed profits tax will be revised 'in the
near future' to give relief to corporations with little or no surplus, and those that are heavily
in debt .... ); Godfrey N. Nelson, New Levy As Cause of Tax-Receipt Lag, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1937, § 3, at 1 (reporting on a bill introduced by Representative Bullwinkle to sunset the
undistributed profits tax after a year and reenact the provisions previously in effect); Taxes
High Enough, Harrison Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1937, at 7 (saying that "a possible
modification of the undistributed corporate earnings tax ... is a matter of study by the
committee").
388. See President Hoping to Avoid New Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1937, at 1.
234
THE RISE OF DOUBLE TAXATION
Secretary Andrew Mellon, 389 Roosevelt attempted to deflect the
blame away from the undistributed profits tax by focusing on
rampant tax evasion."g In his message to Congress in June 1937,
Roosevelt described a Treasury report that revealed "efforts at
avoidance and evasion of tax liability, so widespread and so amazing
both in their boldness and their ingenuity, that further action
without delay seems imperative."'91 The legislation resulting from
such appeals-the Revenue Act of 1937-has been derisively called
"an apple-pie issue."392 No one wanted to oppose the legislation and
be seen as a defender of tax dodgers, but no one was willing to make
it a meaningful weapon against abuse.'
By the late summer of 1937, an economic slowdown changed
the political climate on the issue of taxation. Just when many
Americans believed they had weathered the worst of the
Depression,39' the country experienced one of its quickest downturns
in history.395 According to Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Index of Production (which
averaged 100 between 1923 and 1925) dropped from 117 in August
1937 to 83 in December of the same year."' "Before the economy
picked up in the late spring of 1938," Mark Leff observed,
"industrial production fell by a third, durable-goods production and
stock prices slipped by half, and profits skidded to one-fifth their
1937 highs. Unemployment, always a tragic embarrassment to the
389. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 324-25.
390. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 194-95.
391. The President Urges Legislation to Prevent Tax Evasion (June 1, 1937), in 1937 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLI D. ROOSEVELT 238 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1941).
392. LEFF, supra note 86, at 201.
393. Id. at 201-02. It did make inroads against the personal holding company device, but
preferred to focus on the more high profile abuses such as the incorporated yacht instead of
tackling more serious problems. Id. at 202; BLUM, supra note 142, at 330-37.
394. See LUFF, supra note 86, at 205-06 ('In a May 1937 radio address, South Carolina's
James Byrnes eagerlyjustified the postponement of reform by declaring- ?he emergency has
passed.' Americans polled in April 1937 apparently agreed, with only one.fifth denying that
the Depression was even partly over and over a quarter affirming its end.").
395. Id. at 209.
396. Testimony Before the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Unemployment Relief,
January 4, 1938, in ECONOMIC BALANCE AND A BALANCED BUDGEr:. PAPERS OF MAIRINE S.
EccLEs 89, 91 (Rudolph L. Weissman ed., 1940). Eccles called it "the sharpest rate of decline
in production on record." Id. at 92.
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New Deal, shot up by nearly 4 million."97 Such an abrupt plunge in
the economy sent administration friends and foes alike scurrying for
targets of blame.
The recession created the window of opportunity corporate
managers were waiting for in their attack on the undistributed
profits tax. Critics blamed the tax either partially or completely for
a variety of economic ills,"'8 including the decline of retail credit,"'
delay and termination of expansion plans,4 lagging employment, '"
the onset and aggravation of stock market volatility, 2 and what the
president of General Tire and Rubber Company called, "strikes by
capital," where a lull in business confidence caused both large and
small-time capitalists as well as corporate financiers to keep their
money on the sidelines rather than to invest in business. 403 Horace
Stoneham, President of the New York Giants professional baseball
team, even went so far as to blame the undistributed profits tax for
his team's inability to sign a high profile star like Joe "Ducky
Wucky" Medwick of the St. Louis Cardinals. °' According to
Stoneham:
If you wanted to spend your surplus on ball players, the
government would step in and stop you. That sort of thing is
inimical to baseball. If you make a lot of money you want to
make more by strengthening your club. But you cannot do what
397. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 209.
39S. Another tax provision cited as a cause of the economic downturn was the capital gains
tax. Tax Modification Asked as Trade Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1937, at 28.
399. See Profits Tax Slows Recovery, He Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1937, at 20.
400. See Levy on Profits Halts Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1937, at 24.
401. 15 Criticisms Made of the Profit Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1937, at 24 (United States
Chamber of Commerce study); Surplus Tax Repeal Held Labor Benefit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
1937, § 3, at 8 (National Association of Manufacturers Study).
402. Ballantine Finds New Deal Harmful, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1937, at 10 (highlighting
the undistributed profits tax among New Deal programs "as responsible for the current stock
market slump"); Editorial, A Tax Theory Demolished, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1937, at 4; Our
Taxes Too High, Periling Business, Tremaine Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1937, at 1 ("[New
York State Controller] Tremaine blamed the stock market slump directly upon the Federal
Capital Gains and Losses Tax, and the Undistributed Profits Tax.*).
403. Capital 'Strikes' Laid to Tax Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1937, at 25; Profits Tax Held
Bar to Conftdence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1937, at 33.
404. Unfair to Baseball, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 11, 1937, at 44. Thanks to my colleague, Larry
Garvin, for pointing out that, while modern commentators refer to him as Joe "Ducky"
Medwick, his real nickname was "Ducky Wucky." For further support, see Nicknames, in THE
NEW BILL JAMES HISTOucAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT 157,158 (2001).
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you please. You've got to distribute a large part of your profits to
stockholders. 5
Although economists refuted claims that the undistributed profits
tax was responsible for the recession,' it was not enough to shake
the tag in many people's minds.
These attacks began to have effect as a loosely formed coalition
of conservative Democrats joined Republicans and corporate
managers in demanding repeal of the undistributed profits tax. °7
While a number of members of this conservative coalition were
already opposed to almost all New Deal reforms, the arrival of a
true "Roosevelt recession" had caused many Democrats to reconsider
their blind allegiance to the Administration on tax matters.
408
Several congressmen openly advocated repealing the undistributed
profits tax even while the House Ways and Means Committee began
hearings on possible measures to soften the tax's impact.' Both
current and former members of the Administration, including
former Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Joseph Kennedy
and Interstate Commerce Commission member Joseph Eastman,
joined these converts.41 ° Senator Josiah Bailey of North Carolina,
one of the leaders of the coalition, asked the Senate to pass a
resolution "giving notice that it intended to vote for repeal of the
undistributed profits tax when a revenue bill reached the Senate."4 1
405. Unfair to Baseball, supra note 404, at 44.
406. See Eased Income Tax Urged By Tremaine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1937, at 12 (Dr.
Willard L. Thorp, director of economic research for Dun & Bradstreet, said there was 'danger
in saying that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for the recession.' He declared
there would have been a slump if there had been no such tax.").
407. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 423.
408. See John Robert Moore, Senator Josiah W. Bailey and the "Conservative Manifesto"
of 1937, 31 J. S. HIST. 21, 21 (1965); James T. Patterson, A Conservative Coalition Forms in
Congress, 1933-1939, 52 J. AM. HIST. 757, 765 (1966); see also Creel, supra note 92, at 16
("[W]hat gives an unexpected uncertainty to the outcome is that New Dealers will not present
a solid front against repeals or revisions. Many defections have taken place....").
409. See Byrnes For Tax Revision, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1937, at 4 ("'I am in favor of
modifying, or repealing, the undistributed profits tax,' [Senator Byrnes] said after talking
taxes with President Roosevelt."); see also Turner Catledge, Tax Revision Data to be Heard
Today as Congress Move, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1937, at 1 (describing the purpose of the House
hearings); Glass Would Annul Surplus Profits Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1937, at 38
(referencing Sen. Glass); Treasury to Give New Tax Program to House Group, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 4, 1937, at 1 (referencing Sen. Van Nuys).
410. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 421.
411. See Turner Catledge, Move to Repeal Profit Tax Makes Headway in Senate; Roosevelt
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Although this repeal movement still lacked a majority in Congress,
support for the undistributed profits tax was clearly wavering.
At the same time, a subtle shift was taking place in opponents'
criticism of the undistributed profits tax. Rather than emphasizing
the tax's direct effect on the economic slowdown, opponents began
to focus more on the undistributed profits tax's effect on business
confidence. Walter Lambert noted that "[business spokesmen were
almost unanimous in the belief that the levy on corporate surpluses
had created a climate of fear and uncertainty which, in turn, had
discouraged capital investment and contributed to the economic
recession. 412 The problem, according to Arthur Ballantine, was that
the tax "robs industry of reassuring reserves," or the surpluses that
allowed corporate executives to invest and expand without fear of
bankrupting their companies." Prominent business leaders such as
the president of Chemical Bank advocated repeal "as a means of
restoring confidence among business men." 4 The American
Institute of Accountants issued a report declaring that in order
for business "to face the future confidently" Congress must return
to "fixed principles of ... taxation" and abandon the failed
undistributed profits tax."'
This change in approach appeared calculated to win over
moderate Democrats. While there were some who doubted that
repeal would restore business confidence,1 6 the consensus appeared
to be that the undistributed profits tax was one element in the fear
gripping Wall Street. One contemporary commentator concluded
that moderate Democrats "are convinced that the situation is
dominated by a psychological factor that cannot be ignored." 7
Program Lags, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1937, at 1.
412. LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 414; see Kimmel, supra note 366, at 105-15 (noting that
survey of 360 corporate executives revealed that many corporate expansion plans were
delayed by fear of the tax's effect on surpluses); Godfrey N. Nelson, Loss of Confidence Laid
to Tax of 1936, N.Y. TwIs, Feb. 20, 1938, § 3, at 1 ('Mhe results of research show that the
undistributed-profits tax is one of the major causes of the loss of business confidence.*).
413. Ballantine Finds New Deal Harmful, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1937, at 10.
414. F.K. Houston Urges Repeal of Two Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1937, at 33.
415. Taxation Found 'Bugaboo' of Corporations; Accountants Advocate Nonpartisan Study,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1937, at 41.
416. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 425 (citing an editorial in the New York Post
debunking the theory that business confidence was directly related to high taxes).
417. Creel, supra note 92, at 30.
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Although skeptical that many of the accusations regarding the tax
were accurate, moderates held the view that
capital does believe implicitly and unchangeably that the policy
is restrictive, punitive and paralyzing and. has taken to the
storm cellar. The immediate importance is to bring business out
of its tailspin, and since finance and industry refuse to budge
until changes have been made, then the intelligent course is to
make them.""
3. Revenue Act of 1938
The combination of the recession and business' steady campaign
against the tax changed the fulcrum of the debate that had begun
in 1936. Whereas previously moderate Democrats had supported the
undistributed profits tax originally proposed by Roosevelt, the most
that they were willing to do by 1938 was to preserve the principle in
substantially reduced form. This meant Republicans and Democrats
generally agreed about the tax's fate. The only question was
whether it would be repealed outright or merely nullified by
reducing the rate to the dividend tax rate of 4% or below. In this
context, double taxation became a tool of moderate Democrats
seeking to appease both Roosevelt and corporate managers.
a. Subcommittee Plan
Nowhere was the transformation among moderate Democrats
more evident than in the revision plan introduced by a
subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee." 9 The
418. Id.
The psychological objection to the undistributed-profits tax proved the most
penetrating one. Given the economic and political expectations that the business
community invested in repeal, and given a corporate fetish for stability that had
frozen out industrial expansion, even those who rejected the business analysis
saw the need for concessions.
LEft, supra note 86, at 258.
419. In August, when the 1937 Act was passed, the House also passed a resolution from
Representative Doughton to allow the Ways and Means Committee to conduct an intersession
study of the revenue laws, with special attention to the undistributed profits tax. A
subcommittee was formed which delayed consideration of the issue until November when
Treasury completed its own investigation of the subject. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 255-56.
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subcommittee proposed to merge the undistributed profits and
corporate income taxes by making the corporate income tax rate
dependent on the percentage of net profits distributed. The proposed
corporate income tax would have rates ranging from 16 to 20% for
corporations with net incomes exceeding $25,000 per year.420 A
corporation could reduce its tax by 4/10 of 1% for each 10% of net
profits distributed, with a maximum credit of 4% if a corporation
distributed all its profits as dividends.42' Dividends received still
would be subject to the individual normal tax of 4%.422 Rather than
extolling the proposal's virtues as a tool against tax avoidance,
Vinson emphasized the proposal's revenue-neutral nature.423
Styled as a revision, the House proposal effectively nullified the
undistributed profits tax. In stark contrast to its proposal two years
earlier, when Chairman Fred Vinson pushed through an un-
distributed profits tax with rates reaching as high as 42.5%,424 the
proposal reduced the effective undistributed profits tax rate from a
high of 27% to a high of 4%. Like the Senate Finance Committee
proposal in 1936, this effective rate equaled the normal individual
tax on dividends, thus eliminating any effect the bill would have
on forcing the distribution of profits." As a Wall Street Journal
editorial concluded, the proposal's "net effect if enacted would be
virtually to do away with the present levy."4" In apparent deference
to Roosevelt, the subcommittee sought to retain the principle of the
undistributed profits tax.427 This did not indicate, however, a desire
to continue to use the tax as a lever to force the distribution of
420. See President Seen Agreed to Altering Profits, Gains Taxes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1937,
at 1.
421. Id. at 3.
422. Id.
423. Id. Treasury experts questioned this conclusion. See Profits Tax Change Means Loss,
Treasury Experts Warn Capitol, N.Y. TIMaS, Nov. 25, 1937, at 1.
424. See 1936 House Hearings, supra note 143, at 6.
425. See Editorial, The Proposed Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,1938, at 22 ("This allowance
of 4 per cent for dividends was presumably chosen because that is the normal income tax, and
the security holder will pay it in personal income tax on the dividends when he receives
them.").
426. Editorial, A Ray of Tax Hope, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1937, at 4.
427. See Proposed Revision of the Revenue Laws, 1938: Report of a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Ways & Means, 75th Cong. § 8 (1938) ("On the basis of the facts, your subcommittee
believes that the principle of the undistributed profits tax is sound and should be retained.
However, it is believed that it should be substantially modified.*).
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corporate profits. The subcommittee later explained in its official
report, "[ilt is believed that the basic tax rate should not be so high
as to create undue hardship when for any reason dividend
distributions are impractical."3 8 By reducing the tax to a rate equal
to that on dividend distributions, the subcommittee not only
eliminated the "undue" hardships, but all the hardships accom-
panying a corporate manager's decisions to retain profits.
While Roosevelt seemed amenable to revising the tax, 429 the
House proposal, like the Senate proposal in 1936, went too far
toward a de facto repeal. It retained the principle of undistributed
profits taxation, but not the effect. According to Bernard Kilgore of
the Wall Street Journal, administration officials worked behind the
scenes "to try to preserve far more of the so-called 'principle' of the
undistributed profits tax" than the proposal forwarded by the House
Ways and Means subcommittee.43 ° One of Roosevelt's principal
concerns was the possibility that the watered-down undistributed
profits tax would permit wealthy families to organize corporations
to retain income and thereby avoid the high surtax rates on
individual income."" Thus, he conditioned his approval of the
subcommittee proposal on the strengthening of the penalty on
unreasonable accumulation of corporate surpluses.3 2 The problem
was that this penalty had never proven very effective." 3 Unlike
the personal holding company provision, which had been fairly
successful in containing evasion among the limited number of
corporations subject to it, convincing courts that corporate
managers' decisions to retain corporate profits were "unreasonable"
was difficult."3
428. Id.
429. See Roosevelt For Tax Revision When Congress is Ready', Prepares Housing Message,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1937, at 1; President Seen Agreed to Altering Profits, Gains Taxes, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 24, 1937, at 1. Roosevelt had earlier sent signals that he would be open to a
possible revision. See Arthur Krock, Business Takes Heart Despite Roosevelt Talk, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 1937, § 4, at 3.
430. Bernard Kilgore, Administration "Left-Wingers" Stall For Time to Block Changes in
Laws, WAL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1937, at 1.
431. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 412; LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 433.
432. House Tax Plan Gets Roosevelt's Tentative Approval, WALL ST. J., Dec., 11, 1937, at 1.
This is essentially the modern accumulated earnings tax. See I.R.C. § 531 (2002).
433. See Joseph Alsop & Robert Kintner, Tax Revision Hits on "Third Basket,"N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1937, at 4.
434. The difficulty coming up with a method to strengthen the penalty led to a delay in the
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The solution, devised by Representative Vinson, was to blend the
bright line definitions in the personal holding company provisions
with the principle underlying the penalty for unreasonable accumu-
lations of corporate profits." 5 He proposed imposing an additional
20% rate on certain closely held corporations that retained 40% or
more of their earnings.""6 Coupled with the regular corporate tax
imposed under the subcommittee plan, the maximum effective rate
would be 32%, or approximately the same maximum rate imposed
under the existing undistributed profits tax.437 Although this "third
basket tax," as it came to be called,438 was expected to apply to fewer
than 1,000 corporations, this group potentially included notable
corporations such as the Ford Motor Company.4 9 This appeared
sufficient to garner Roosevelt's blessing and become part of the
subcommittee's final report."'
b. House
During the January 1938 hearings before the House Ways and
Means Committee, Treasury officials quickly reassured business
that the subcommittee's proposal substantially freed corporate
release of the subcommittee's final recommendations. See Tax Revision Delayed as Committee
Disbands, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1937, at 1.
435. See Tax Draft Covers Private Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1938, at 5 ("The proposed
legislation seeks to give a definition that would avert litigation as to actual status.").
436. See Tax Plan Calls For Closely Held Firms To Pay Special 20%, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7,
1938, at 1. A corporation was considered "closely held" for these purposes if it was held by one
family or primarily by a group of not more than ten unrelated individuals. Id. at 7. Such
closely held corporations were considered to be a significant source of abuse by wealthy
taxpayers. Id.
437. Id.
438. It was called the "third basket" to signify that it was the third of three classifications.
The first two classifications were for corporations with incomes less than $25,000 annually
and for all other corporations, whether publicly or closely held.
439. See Tax Draft Covers Private Companies, supra note 435, at 5. In response to the
media speculation that the third basket tax was aimed at Ford, Ways and Means Chair
Doughton and subcommittee Chair Vinson issued a joint statement that not only was Ford
not the target of the tax, but it would not even be subject to the tax because Ford routinely
distributed almost 70% of its earnings. See Hold Tax Revision Not Aimed at Ford, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1938, at 2. Despite such responses, opponents insisted that the tax was designed to
target "a 'couple or maybe three' corporations which the administration is said to be
determined to punish .... " Henry N. Dorris, Foes of 'Third Basket' Tax Count Committee
Majority to Kill It, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 1938, at 1, 7.
440. See BLUM, supra note 142, at 442.
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managers from the perceived shackles imposed by the undistributed
profits tax. Roswell Magill, the Under Secretary of the Treasury and
former Columbia law professor who testified first on behalf of the
subcommittee's proposal, noted several times that the bill imposed
only a "somewhat" lower burden for corporations that distributed,
rather than retained earnings." 1 In response to a question from
Representative Vinson, Magill emphasized that once a corporation
had paid the maximum 20% tax, it was "entirely free" to spend its
earnings in whatever manner it wished." 2 Although Magill disputed
charges that the bill merely was a "face-saving" policy, 43 he was
clearly walking a tightrope between reassuring business and
defending the continued need for an undistributed profits tax.
Opponents, emboldened by the popular outrage against the tax,
argued that maintaining even the nominal undistributed profits
tax proposed in the subcommittee report was unacceptable. The
United States Chamber of Commerce recommended "[rlepeal[ing]
the thoroughly discredited undistributed-profits tax and openly
abandon[ing] the 'principle.' As one railroad executive noted,
nothing short of repeal would be sufficient:
The continuation of this tax, even in the modified form proposed,
will continue to hamper business and destroy the confidence of
business management in its ability to look ahead and to plan
and enter into long-time commitments, which constitutes the
very essence of recovery. This tax should be repealed in its
entirety.445
While corporate managers spoke of the hardships still imposed
under the revised tax, the principal concern appeared to be that
441. Revision of Revenue Laws 1938: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 75th Cong. § 104, at 136 (1938) (statement of Roswell Magill, Under Secretary of the
Treasury).
442. Id. at 133.
443. Id. at 136 (responding to a statement from Rep. Crowther).
444. Id. at 468 (prepared statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord, United States Chamber of
Commerce); see also id. at 155 (statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade) ("The
undistributed profits tax stands before the country today thoroughly convicted as an
undesirable tax and as harmful to business and to confidence. It has earned its execution. Let
it die.").
445. Id. at 401 (statement of George Houston, President of Baldwin Locomotive Works).
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retaining the principle would invite the reintroduction of more
meaningful rates in subsequent years.'
Somewhat surprising was business leaders' criticism of the third
basket tax. It was expected that the closely held corporations most
likely to be affected by the penalty provision would be vocal in their
opposition,'4 7 but managers of large corporations presumably would
have been willing to accept this provision in exchange for the
nullification of the undistributed profits tax. Nevertheless, they also
bitterly complained about the third basket tax. For instance,
Ellsworth Alvord of the United States Chamber of Commerce called
the tax a threat to the pioneers in American industry." While the
Chamber may have been speaking on behalf of its members that
would be subject to the tax, Alvord made clear that the Chamber's
objections mirrored those raised against the undistributed profits
tax."9 According to Alvord, ending all penalties against managers
for exercising their sound discretion in the operation of their
businesses was critical to restore "confidence ... [and] start the
wheels of business. "' Opposition to the third basket tax, thus, was
part of a general campaign to remove all traces of the undistributed
profits principle from the Act.
446. See, e.g., Tax Bill Sent to Conference, House Not Yielding on Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 1938, at 1 (Rep. Lamneck of Ohio "declared that the business interests were absolutely
opposed to the undistributed profits tax theory, as retained in the House bill, 'not because it
is going to levy a high tax on them, but because they fear we may use the principle to raise
the rates and change the schedule.').
447. Revision of Revenue Laws 1938: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 75th Cong. §§ 1005, 1006 (1938) (statement of Benjamin H. Naur, President of A.I.
Namm & Son) ("[Tihe framers of the proposed penalty tax have not fully considered the
implications as to whether we continue as a family-owned, family-run, and independent store
or not. They would make it difficult and perhaps impossible for us to compete with our
publicly-owned competitors."); id. at 562 (statement of Albert D. Hutzler, President of Hutzler
Brothers Company) ("If this law were passed, our competitors could amortize their
mortgages-and they also have them-and build up their working capital with no penalty,
while we and the other local stores would be competitively penalized."); id. at 619 (statement
of Edward H. Lane, Lane Cedar Chest Company) ("We do not see why you single us out and
make us pay 50 percent more in taxes than you do these big monopolistic corporations that
have access to the general capital markets."); id. at 403 (statement of Thomas E. Donnelly,
President of Donnelly & Sons) (calling the third basket tax "a tax upon owner management"
because it targets corporations which, by their very nature, are run by the owners of the
corporation).
448. Id. at 470 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, United States Chamber of Commerce).
449. Id. at 488-89.
450. Id. at 471.
244
THE RISE OF DOUBLE TAXATION
In an unexpected turn of events,"1 the House retained at least
a nominal undistributed profits tax, but heeded opponents' calls to
remove the third basket tax.452 Acceptance of the former provision
was greased by the operation of the dividend tax. As Representative
Vinson noted, "[tihe only undistributed-profits tax we have until we
get to I-B [the third basket tax] is a 4-percent rate, the same rate
that an individual pays, as a normal tax upon any dividend that
would be paid out."" 3 In the subcommittee's view, Representative
Vinson explained, "it is just as fair for the Federal Government to
get a 4-percent tax on money retained as it is to collect it from the
shareholder as a normal tax when distributed."' This was a
substantial admission that the undistributed profits tax was no
longer a pressure tax at all because of the operation of the dividend
tax.
According to the Minority report on the Ways and Means
Committee, removing the third basket tax provision may have been
due to "a widespread feeling ... that another purpose of the proposed
penalty tax is to provide the administration with a means of
retaliation against certain corporations controlled by a few
individuals who differ politically with the administration and who
have resisted certain New Deal policies with which they do not
agree."" More likely, however, especially in an election year," the
third basket tax simply ran afoul of the political symbolism
451. See House Set to Pass Tax Bill Without Major Amendment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1938,
at 2 (reporting prior to the debates on the floor that "[t]he leadership is confident, however,
that it can muster sufficient strength to protect the measure against important revisions").
452. See House Appears Indifferent as Tax Bill Debate Begins, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1938,
at 2.
453. 83 CONG. REC. 2996 (1938) (statement of Rep. Vinson).
454. Id.
455. 83 CONG. REC. 2776 (1938) (views of the Minority to the House Ways and Means
Committee Report, entered into the record by Rep. Treadway). Representative William
McFarlane even accused the Ways and Means Committee of delaying consideration of the
third basket tax "in order to give big business sufficient time to crystallize sentiment even
against the third basket which is the only part of the shell left concerning the undistributed
profits tax." W.D. McFarlane, Capitol Newsletter, WICHITA BANNER (Feb. 11, 1938), in William
Doddridge McFarlane Papers, 1919-1981, Box No. 3U265, Center for American History, Univ.
of Texas.
456. See Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Congressional Progress Since Tax Fight of'35, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1938, at 1 (stating that the rejection of the third basket tax "is especially
worth the notice of students of political trends when it is recalled that 1938, unlike 1935, is
for all members of the House a re-election year").
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associated with the family-owned business. 57 This defeat was
considered a crushing blow to Roosevelt, with the Wall Street
Journal reporting that some believed it signaled "that the peak of
President Roosevelt's influence over the national legislature may
have passed."" Treasury Secretary Morgenthau considered the
House's vote to remove the third basket tax from the bill "the worst
slap the President had to take during his entire administration."459
c. Senate
As the House completed its consideration of the revenue bill, it
was clear that the Senate would be less charitable toward
Roosevelt's plea for preserving the principle of the undistributed
profits tax. The chair of the committee, Senator Pat Harrison, issued
a statement announcing his intent to secure the tax's repeal: "While
the House retained only the skeleton of the undistributed profits tax
... the remains will haunt business, and its complete removal and
return to a sufficient flat corporation tax is preferable.""0 Even
before hearing the complaints of business leaders, the Finance
Committee privately grilled Treasury officials about projected
revenue yields under the House bill and possible alternatives.J1
Essentially, the Finance Committee concentrated on replacing the
tax rather than neutralizing it through double taxation.
In light of the Senate Finance Committee's predisposition for a
quick recommendation of repeal, 2 business leaders kept their
457. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 260. Newspaper corporations, typically family-owned and
therefore subject to the tax, perpetuated this rhetoric with a constant barrage of attacks.
Profit Tax Repeal Beaten in House; '3d Basket' Fought, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1938, at 1.
458. See House Tax Bill Revolt Bares Weakened Roosevelt Control, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10,
1938, at 2; see also Editorial, An Independent Congress, N.Y. TInES, Mar. 12, 1938, at 16 ("It
is increasingly evident that the era of 'rubber-stamp' legislation has ended in Washington and
that Congress intends to assert its own prerogatives in the matter of ... national policies.").
459. BLUM, supra note 142, at 444.
460. Harrison Demands End of Profits Tax to Help Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1938,
at 1.
461. See generally Revenue Act of 1938: Hearing on H.R. 9682 Before the Sen. Comm. on
Finance, 75th Cong. (1938) [hereinafter 1938 Senate Hearings] (statement of Roswell Magill,
Under Secretary of the Treasury).
462. See Senators to Start Tax Hearing Today, N.Y. TINES, Mar. 17, 1938, at 13 ("Senator
Harrison, chairman of the committee, said tonight that he hoped to ... report a bill within two
weeks .... Fifteen of the committee of twenty-one members have saidl they favorO elimination
of the undistributed profits tax principle ...2).
246 [Vol. 44:167
THE RISE OF DOUBLE TAXATION
comments regarding the undistributed profits tax relatively brief.'
Nevertheless, the testimony contained two recurring themes: (1)
The undistributed profits tax was having a deleterious effect on
business confidence; and (2) only repeal could bolster business
confidence. To the extent they addressed other concerns with the
income tax portion of the House bill, the testimony focused on the
capital gains tax, rather than the continued double taxation of
corporate income.
Although the undistributed profits tax's negative impact on
business confidence was by this time a common refrain, witnesses
suggested the matter had become more urgent. The general counsel
for the Illinois Manufacturers' Association wrote that, "[ulnless
Congress will act now, at this time, to dispel the all-enveloping
cloud over the future of business and industry, the outlook is
calamitous."' Business leaders conceded that the current economic
problems were largely "a matter of psychology,""' but the un-
distributed profits tax's contribution to these problems arguably
were significant "whether it is a real anxiety or a psychological
anxiety of businessmen as to the effects of existing laws on their
operations."'" The National Association of Manufacturers filed a
report stating:
The psychological effect of this tax has been even more serious
[than the direct effect of eliminating a source of industrial
capital]. It has been universally condemned by businessmen
large and small and has created a fear on their part that the
purpose of government through its tax laws is to make
impossible the earning of a sufficient rate of return to induce
investment of new capital .... 4
463. See 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 461, at 460 (statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord,
United States Chamber of Commerce) ("I do not think it is necessary for me to repeat my
views with respect to the undistributed-profits tax .... They are all a matter of record and
readily available.").
464. Id. at 660 (statement of David R. Clarke, General Counsel, Illinois Manufacturers'
Association).
465. Id. at 468 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, United States Chamber of Commerce).
466. Id. at 178 (statement of H.B. Spalding, Committee on Government Finances, National
Association of Manufacturers).
467. Id. at 180.
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Joseph Klein of the New York State Society of Certified Public
Accountants suggested the situation had reached such crisis
proportions that the committee should "make public" any "early
determinations of the kind which business pleads for with respect
to the undistributed-profits tax ..." so as "to calm existing fears and
uncertainty."'
Business leaders emphasized that the only way to ease the crisis
of business confidence was to repeal the undistributed profits tax
altogether. These individuals first repeated their earlier argument
that retaining the principle would not alleviate concerns that
punitive rates would not someday re-emerge. A representative of
the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce warned that retaining the
principle would make it "an ever-constant threat,""9 while M.L.
Seidman of the New York Board of Trade predicted that "it would
remain to haunt business, not only for what it is, but also for what
it may eventually grow into if permitted to remain as a permanent
part of our tax structure." 7 ° Ellsworth Alvord of the United States
Chamber of Commerce asked "if you impose 3 1/3 percent this year
... what is there to assure a businessman that you will not boost that
penalty to 42 percent, as was proposed two years ago?"471 More
importantly, perhaps, business leaders suggested that the complete
repeal of the undistributed profits tax would actually increase
revenues, and obviate the need for a rate increase by releasing the
economy's pent-up energy. The Secretary of the American Mining
Congress reported that "[wle believe the repeal of the undistributed-
profits tax would stimulate business and increase the tax base from
which the Government obtains revenue to such an extent that it
468. Id. at 399 (statement of Dr. Joseph J. Klein, Chairman of the Committee on Federal
Taxation, New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants).
469. See 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 461, at 183 (statement of J.W. Hooper,
Chairman of the Federal Tax Committee, Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce).
470. Id. at 257 (statement of M.L. Seidman, Chairman of Taxation Committee, New York
Board of Trade).
471. Id. at 469 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, United States Chamber of Commerce).
Henry Heimann of the National Association of Credit Men echoed these sentiments, stating:
We think that the present undistributed-profits tax will not constitute the
menace, the penalty that it has in the past, but nevertheless we still believe the
principle of the tax is dangerous, and there is no assurance at any time that the
law may not be changed with respect to rates so that the same danger that was
inherent in the 1936 bill will again become included in the bill.
Id. at 19 (statement of Henry H. Heimann, National Association of Credit Men).
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would far more than offset the apparent loss of revenue from
elimination of this tax."'7 2 Alvord agreed, stating, "you can make
much more money by telling investors, by telling business, by telling
labor, all three, that the principle of the undistributed-profits tax is
abandoned completely and forever and they no longer have to worry
about the penalties."'73 Based on an assumption that repealing the
undistributed profits tax would increase business by 6%, Alvord
concluded that the Senate could adopt a flat 15% tax on corporate
income and still raise as much revenue as the House bill."7'
Despite speaking before a relatively sympathetic Senate Finance
Committee, and despite a startlingly forthright concession by
Treasury official Roswell Magill that the double taxation of
corporate income was unfair, 75 business leaders did not seek to use
this forum to advocate for the revival of a dividend exemption for
individuals. While this might have been due to a desire not to be
greedy or to confuse the issues, no such concerns prevented them
from seeking a reduction in the tax on capital gains and other
amendments designed to aid business. 76 Alvord of the United States
472. Id. at 477-78 (statement of Julian D. Conover, Secretary, American Mining Congress);
see also id. at 397 (statement of Dr. Joseph J. Klein, Chairman of the Committee on Federal
Taxation, New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants) ('[Ilf the undistributed
profits tax remnant were completely eliminated the psychological effect on business might be
what you wish it to be, and that the taxable income that would flow consequent upon such
elimination would more than make up for the slight loss of revenue.").
473. Id. at 467 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, United States Chamber of Commerce). The
call to "tell ... labor" may have been reference to the American Federation of Labor's recent
demand for a repeal or modification of the undistributed profits tax as a method of restoring
public confidence in the economy. Louis Stark, Profit Tax Repeal Demanded by A.F.L., N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1938, at 6.
474. 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 461, at 467 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce).
475. See id. at 680-81 (statement of Roswell Magill, Under Secretary of the Treasury). In
contrasting the treatment of distributed and undistributed corporate income, Magill pointed
out:
mhe distributed corporation income is somewhat more heavily taxed, since the
corporation has paid a normal tax of 8 to 15 percent on it before distribution, and
the stockholder is subject to a second normal tax of 4 percent, as well as to any
applicable surtaxes, when he receives the dividend. In fairness, he might
properly be given a credit against his own normal tax for the normal tax already
paid by the corporation.
Id When Senator King asked Professor Magill if such a shareholder credit system was not
already the practice in England, Magill responded that it was "and we did it here until 1936."
Id. at 681.
476. See, e.g., id. at 167-68 (statement of Victor H. Stempf, Committee on Taxation,
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Chamber of Commerce acknowledged that repealing the
undistributed profits tax was his highest priority, but reducing the
capital gains tax was a close second." H.B. Spalding of the National
Association of Manufacturers echoed this point, noting that his
group had "consistently opposed the inclusion in net income of
capital gains and losses, believing that taxation of capital gains and
losses has no place in an income tax. " 47
In reality, capital gains taxation may have been a higher
concern for business leaders. 79 The Nation suggested that
business' number one priority was the repeal of the capital gains
tax, but the undistributed profits tax simply proved an easier
target.' ° This would be consistent with corporate managers'
preference for retained earnings. As long as dividends are taxed, but
capital gains from sales of stock are not taxed or are subject to
taxation at greatly reduced rates, most stockholders are likely to
encourage retention of earnings. This permits them to recoup their
share of the corporate earnings through the more tax-advantaged
method of a sale of the stock.
This failure to raise the double taxation issue was not because
of the ignorance of the issue generally. The United States Chamber
of Commerce specifically protested a House proposal to limit the
credit corporations received for dividends from subsidiaries. In
defense of its position, the Chamber noted that "[tihe existing tax
burdens upon corporate dividends are extremely heavy. The
earnings and profits, out of which the dividends are paid, have
already been subjected to taxation in the hands of the corporation
American Institute of Accountants) (advocating, among other things, repeal of the
undistributed profits tax, reduction in the capital gains tax, and restoration of consolidated
returns); id. at 182 (statement of J.W. Hooper, Chairman of the Federal Tax Committee,
Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce) (reporting the results of a survey of business executives in
which the first two priorities were repeal of the undistributed profits tax and the tax on
capital gains).
477. Id. at 468; see also id. at 138 (statement of William J. Kelly, Machinery and Allied
Products Institute) (advocating a reduction in the capital gains rate after replacing the
undistributed profits tax with a flat corporate income tax).
478. Id. at 178 (statement of H.B. Spalding, Committee on Government Finances, National
Association of Manufacturers).
479. Id. at 258 (statement of M.L. Seidman, Chairman of Taxation Committee, New York
Board of Trade) ("But, by far the most important single item in this bill is its provision for the
treatment of capital gains and losses.").
480. See Notes, NATION, Nov. 27, 1937, at 574.
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paying the dividend." It concluded that this "double and multiple
taxation ... should be eliminated."' Despite the similarity between
the double tax burden imposed on intercorporate dividends and that
on dividends to shareholders, the Chamber and other business
representatives did not expand their arguments.'82 Apparently, only
the intercorporate double tax burden affected corporate managers'
ability to operate their companies. The double taxation from
distributions to shareholders was simply too far down on the
managers' list of concerns.'S
As expected, both the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate
heeded business' complaints and overwhelmingly voted to repeal the
undistributed profits tax altogether.' In a Senate floor debate that
took only two and a half hours-less time than was afforded to the
discussion of a proposed excise tax on pork8---Senator Harrison
justified a 2% increase in the lowest corporate normal tax by
suggesting it would "encourage private business" if it were free of
the undistributed profits tax.' Robert La Follette, the lone senator
who publicly challenged the repeal, discounted Harrison's claims,
stating "this tax has been the object of one of the most widely
organized and most successful propaganda campaigns in the history
481. 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 461, at 475 (Brief of Ellsworth Alvord, United States
Chamber of Commerce).
482. See, e.g., id. at 183 (statement of J.W. Hooper, Chairman of the Federal Tax
Committee, Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce) ("The proposed bill does not eliminate the
inequitable feature found in the present law in the duplication of taxation by way of taxing
intercompany dividends.").
483. Even those business leaders who complained about high individual surtax rates
justified a reduction primarily by reference to the needs of managers. One trade group
representative, for example, stated: "It is my belief that with a reduction to a maximum of not
more than 50 percent tax rate on individuals, that a very substantial amount of capital will
be redirected into business enterprise, which we urgently need there .... Id. at 110 (statement
of Claude W. Dudley, Millers National Federation).
484. See Lauren D. Lyman, Profits Tax Eliminated, Gains Levy is Modified by Senate
Finance Group, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1938, at 1 (reporting a vote of seventeen to four); Senate
Approves Most of Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1938, at 13 (noting that on the voice vote
apparently only four senators opposed eliminating the undistributed profits tax).
485. Alfred F. Flynn, Senate Drives Tax Bill Toward Final Vote; Foes Yield, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 8, 1938, at 1 ("In an amazing burst of speed, which naturally left some confusion in its
wake, the Senate agreed to more than 250 pages of controversial legislation in about 30
minutes."); Senate Approves Most of Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1938, at 13.
486. 83 CONG. REc. 4928 (1938) (statement of Sen. Harrison) (noting that under the House
bill, a corporation would only pay a 16% income tax if it distributed all of its profits while the
Senate bill imposed a flat 18% income tax).
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of tax legislation." 7 According to Senator La Follette, "The repeal
of the undistributed-profits tax will reestablish huge tax favors in
behalf of retained corporate income.' 8 His pleas, however, fell on
deaf ears as Senators appeared to be primarily concerned with
restoring business confidence. On this front, they were by all
accounts successful. The New York Times called the repeal "the most
reassuring single piece of news that has come out of Washington in
many months." 9
d. Conference
Almost immediately after the Senate vote, Roosevelt went on the
offensive to try to force the conference committee to retain what was
left of the undistributed profits tax principle.4 In a letter to House
Ways and Means Committee Chair Robert Doughton and Senate
Finance Committee Chair Pat Harrison,49 Roosevelt attempted
to position the undistributed profits tax as an ally of the small
corporation:
487. Id. at 4932 (statement of Sen. La Follette). La Follette's Investigating Committee in
the Senate found that the National Association of Manufacturers had spent almost $1 million
a year fighting the undistributed profits tax since its passage. In conjunction with the efforts
of other groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce:
[Elvery known medium of reaching the public with their propaganda has been
used, including advertising in the daily and weekly newspapers, and colored
news articles. The [La Follette Investigating Committee] records show they have
also used direct mail, booklets, leaflets, bulletin board posters, 24 sheet posters
for outdoor boards, pay envelope slips, sound slide films, moving picture slides,
plant publications and house organ service, nation-wide radio programs,
including the "American Family Robinson" cartoon service and the "Uncle
Abner" series and under many other names.
W.D. McFarlane, Weekly Newsletter, WICHrTA BANNER (Mar. 11, 1938), in William Doddridge
McFarlane Papers, 1919-1981, supra note 455.
488. 83 CONG. REC. 4933 (1938) (statement of Sen. La Follette).
489. Editorial, For Complete Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1938, at 18; see also Editorial,
A Reassuring Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1938, at 14 ("When the business community
begins to recover from its bad case of jitters (and there are signs that it is on the verge of
doing so), it will see in this Tax Bill a remarkably reassuring sign.").
490. See Roosevelt May Ask Retention of Surtax in Revenue Measure, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11,
1938, at 1 ("President Roosevelt is still firmly wedded to the undistributed profits tax idea
491. The letter was actually drafted by Roswell Magill after Roosevelt asked Treasury
Secretary Henry Morgenthau "to prepare a letter for the conference committee which the 'man
in the street' could understand." BLUM, supra note 142, at 444.
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It would be particularly undesirable to eliminate the
undistributed profits tax at this time, in favor of a flat rate of
tax, representing an increase in the tax burden on many small
corporations, and on all corporations which follow established
American practices of dividend distribution; and a decrease in
the tax burden of many large corporations, which have hoarded
their earnings in the past, and would be encouraged to resume
the practice in the future.492
"[Repeal," Roosevelt wrote, would "strike at the root of fundamental
principles of taxation. Business will be helped, not hurt, by these
suggestions." 3 While this "unusual if not unprecedented attempt
to dictate the terms of the conference agreement" served to publicly
reaffirm his commitment to the undistributed profits tax prin-
ciple,494 Roosevelt privately told advisers to cut the best deal they
could under the circumstances. 495
Roosevelt's letter appeared to achieve its desired effect. When
the conference began, many thought the House managers were "in
a mood to compromise."4' After the letter was made public,
however, House conferees began to dig in their heels on retaining
at least the principle of the undistributed profits tax.49 7 Senate
conferees "resented" Roosevelt's intrusion into the conference
process, 498 but managed only to orchestrate a stalemate that lasted
nearly a month.4' 9 Faced with the possibility that this would result
492. The President Discusses the Pending Tax Bill, April 13, 1938, in 1938 THE PUBLIc
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLiN D. ROOsEVELT 214, 216-17 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1941).
493. Id. at 217.
494. Editorial, The President Intervenes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1938, at 22; Roosevelt Letter
on Profits and Gains Taxes Irks Congress, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1938, at 3.
495. BLUM, supra note 142, at 445; LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 486. One reassuring fact
for Roosevelt may have been the government's success in using the accumulated earnings tax
against a company it accused ,of purposely avoiding the distribution of dividends. See
Helvering v. Natl Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 289 (1938); High Court Backs Profits Tax Basis,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 17, 1938, at 1.
496. Arthur Krock, Political Perils of Tax Conference Failure, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 19, 1938,
at 20.
497. See Conferees Deadlocked on Capital Gains and Surtax Issues, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19,
1938, at 2; House Conferees Seek to Retain Surtax Principle, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1938, at 1.
498. Senators Revolt as Roosevelt Acts to Save Surplus, Capital Gains Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 1938, at 1.
499. See LAMBERT, supra note 106, at 486; Conferees on Tax Reach a Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1938, at 15.
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in no bill to reform the undistributed profits tax,' the Senate
conferees finally agreed to impose a 19% corporate income tax with
a maximum 2.5% credit for distribution of all of a corporation's net
earnings. 5 1 Perhaps most significantly, conferees agreed the
undistributed profits tax would expire after 1939.2 The New York
Times reported:
[tihe Senate conferees, in explaining their surrender on the
undistributed profits tax principle, asserted that the reduction
of the super tax rate to 2 per cent and its limitation to two
years, plus the modifications to help corporations with debts or
impaired capital, met most of the objections to the undistributed
profits tax.m
This "face-saving compromise," as one Republican Senate
conferee described it,' did not appear to save enough face for
Roosevelt. Despite Republican complaints that he had tainted the
conference process in order to secure the compromise,' Roosevelt
publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome. The bill,
which passed both the House and Senate with little debate,' sat for
several weeks awaiting the President's signature. Finally, in a
speech delivered during the commencement exercises of a rural high
school in West Virginia, Roosevelt announced that he would allow
the bill to become law without signing it.5 7 While he chose to refrain
500. Profits Tax Looms as Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1938, at 4.
While the compromise was not all that certain groups had hoped for, it was
regarded here as removing a potential threat to the Administration's recovery
program by ending fears that a continued deadlock of the Senate and House
conferees on the Tax Bill might leave in force the present revenue legislation,
which many regard as definitely worse than the proposed law ....
Id.
501. Business Tax Aids Retained in New Compromise Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1938, at
1; Lauren D. Lyman, Conferees Agree on Revenue Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1938, at 2.
502. Modified Surplus Tax for Two Years Retained in Senate-House Compromise, N.Y.
TmEs, Apr. 23, 1938, at 1.
503. Id.
504. Profits Tax Looms as Election Issue, supra note 500, at 4.
505. See, e.g., 83 CONG. Rzc. 6691 (1938) (statement of Rep. Treadway).
506. See House Passes Tax Bill Expected to Aid Business; Goes to Roosevelt Today, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 1938, at 1 ("The debate lasted little more than an hour .... "); Senate Approves
Modified Tax Bill, N.Y. TImEs, May 10, 1938, at 33 ("Using little more than five minutes, the
Senate approved today the conference report on the $5,330,000,000 Tax Revision Bill.*).
507. Felix Belair, Jr., Roosevelt Scores Tax Bill, Asks RevampingNext Year; ItBecomes Law
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from vetoing the legislation because of the "many good features" he
saw in the bill, he wanted to emphasize his disagreement with its
treatment of certain items such as undistributed profits taxes."s~ "By
taking that course," he said:
I am calling the definite attention of the American people to
those unwise parts of the bill that I have been talking to you
about today-one of them which may restore in the future
certain forms of tax avoidance of the past, and of continued
concentrated investment power, which we in Washington had
begun to end....
Thus, for the first time in Roosevelt's career he permitted a bill to
become law without his signature. 10
4. Revenue Act of 1939
Although Roosevelt still hoped the undistributed profits tax
principle could be maintained beyond its scheduled expiration,51'
he was left with few allies in this cause. Treasury now openly
rejected continuing the undistributed profits tax principle.
Testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee, Treasury
Secretary Morgenthau classified the undistributed profits tax as one
of the system's "tax irritants."'12 According to Morgenthau, "In its
Unsigned, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1938, at 1.
508. Id. (citing favorably the strengthening of the accumulated earnings tax and the
lessening of taxes on smaller corporations).
509. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Arthurdale, West Virginia (May 27, 1938), in 1938
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 355, 365 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1941).
510. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Discusses the Pending Tax Bill (Apr. 13, 1938),
in 1938 THE PuBLic PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLI D. ROOSEVELT 214, 218 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1941). Indeed, it was the first time since the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment that a revenue bill was allowed to become law without the President's approval.
See Godfrey N. Nelson, Disputes President on Some Tax Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1938, §
3, at 1.
511. See LEFF, supra note 86, at 269; Turner Catledge, Morgenthau Says Tax Plan Remains
Open to Congress, N.Y, TIMES, May 12, 1939, at 1 ("Mbe President's spokesmen in Congress
continued their efforts to arrange a plan whereby the disputed corporate tax structure, which
expires automatically Dec. 31, might be extended temporarily, pending a more thorough study
by Congressional committees of possible tax deterrents to business.").
512. Revenue Revision-1939: Hearing Before the House Committee on Ways & Means, 76th
Cong. § 5 (1939) [hereinafter 1939 House Hearings] (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
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present form this tax is unimportant and does not accomplish the
objectives of the original proposal. The tax produces little revenue
and has little effect on business."13 He did not object to a proposal
to eliminate the remaining 2.5% tax.51 Administration officials also
were reported to favor repealing the undistributed profits tax.515
With Treasury and the Administration all but conceding defeat
on the undistributed profits tax, business leaders not surprisingly
attempted for the first time to highlight the double taxation of
corporate income in their testimony. In prepared statements for
the Ways and Means Committee, members of the United States
Chamber of Commerce,516 the American Mining Congress,5 17 the
National Association of Manufacturers," and the New York Board
of Trade519 advocated removing dividends from the individual
normal tax and thus relieving corporate income from double
taxation. The National Association of Manufacturers wrote:
[Wle seriously object to the principle of double taxation involved
in taxing dividends as earned by a corporation, and then again
when received by the individual. Tax equity is violated in such
a case, particularly as concerns the normal tax rates, or, indeed,
any tax rate which does not exempt the percentage of income tax
paid by the corporation first receiving the income.52
Apparently, the demise of the undistributed profits tax helped
to realign manager-shareholder interests on the question of double
taxation. Once double taxation was no longer necessary to offset the
pressure to distribute profits, corporate managers acknowledged
double taxation's negative effect on a decision to invest in a business
operating in corporate form. As one executive wrote in a letter to the
Ways and Means Committee, "since in recent years all corporate
Secretary of the Treasury).
513. Id.
514. Id. at 11 (colloquy between Sec'y Morgenthau and Rep. McCormack).
515. See Alfred F. Flynn, Four Point Plan for Tax Revision Being Considered, WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 1939, at 1.
516. 1939 House Hearings, supra note 512, at 105 (statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord,
United States Chamber of Commerce).
517. Id. at 135 (statement of Julian D. Conover, American Mining Congress).
518. Id. at 146 (statement of Noel Sargent, National Association of Manufacturers).
519. Id. at 177 (statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade).
520. Id. at 149 (statement of Noel Sargent, National Association of Manufacturers).
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dividends were made subject not only to the graduated surtax but
also to normal tax upon the stockholder receiving the dividend the
corporation tax on income has been nothing but a penalty tax upon
the corporate form of doing business.5 21 Such attacks were not made
with the same energy applied to the undistributed profits tax itself,
but corporate managers nonetheless appeared to elevate the issue
on their list of priorities.
Notwithstanding the reemergence of business leaders' opposition
to double taxation, they never made it an issue in the hearings due
to more pressing concerns. The main focus was to expedite a
business tax assistance program negotiated by congressional leaders
and officials from Treasury and the Administration.522 Under this
program, business would receive four major tax benefits. The
program would (1) replace the undistributed profits tax and
corporate income tax at rates ranging from 16.5 to 19% with a flat
18% corporate income tax, (2) permit an annual revaluation of
capital stock for purposes of the capital stock tax, (3) eliminate the
limit on capital loss deductions for corporations, and (4) permit
corporations to carryforward losses for two or three years.23
Unlike the relief of double taxation, these measures were designed
to increase managers' flexibility and independence. As the Wall
Street Journal pointed out with respect to the capital loss provision,
"[riemoval ... of the $2,000 limitation on the deduction of capital
losses from taxable income would do something to encourage
corporation managements to venture more freely for the
development of new lines of business, greater volume in old lines
and wider employment in both."2 " A similar view was expressed
with respect to the loss carryforward provision, with one expert
opining that "the provision might also encourage some corporate
investment, inasmuch as a considerable portion of entrepreneur
investing in the past has been done by corporations."525
521. Id. at 190-91 (statement of D.P. Larsen, Shevlin, Carpenter & Clarke Company).
522. See Congress Leaders Plan to Expedite Tax Aid Legislation, WALLST. J., May 17,1939,
at 1; Leaders to Push Business Tax Aid at Present Session, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1939, at 1.
523. Flynn, supra note 515, at 1. The latter provision was eventually extended to
individuals and partnerships in the final House bill. See House Passes Tax Revision Bill
Approval by Senate Likely, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1939, at 2; Two New Concessions to Business
Included in House Tax Bill, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1939, at 1.
524. Editorial, Promising Changes in Tax Laws, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1939, at 4.
525. William J. Enright, Losses Provision in Tax Bill Hailed, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1939,
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Because of concerns that delay might allow Roosevelt to
sabotage the business tax aid program,"s congressional leaders
pressed to exclude the public debate of issues, such as the double
taxation of corporate income, that were less important to business
leaders. During executive session, Representative Doughton
secured approval for a motion to limit discussion "to the subject
of corporation taxes."527 This move was not uncontroversial. One
representative proposed that the committee "give public con-
sideration to all taxes which are business deterrents (whether
corporate, partnership or individual)" his motion on the matter
failed. 28 Representative Doughton announced that witnesses
desiring to make statements on other issues "may file briefs which
will be considered by the subcommittee and the full committee,
when they get down to the work of writing the bill." 29 Thus, when
Noel Sargent of the National Association of Manufacturers tried to
raise the double taxation issue in his testimony, he was permitted
only to submit his remarks for the record.53 ° The result was that,
although business leaders favored eliminating double taxation,
there apparently was not sufficient support to get it on the agenda
for consideration.
As agency cost theory would predict,"3 double taxation thus
survived the repeal of the undistributed profits tax because other
issues were of more immediate concern to corporate managers and
their allies. The tax bill sailed through the House and the Senate
Finance Committees without consideration of the double taxation
§ 3, at 7 (quoting J.M. Finke, of Klein, Hind & Finke, CPA).
526. See Roosevelt Speech Not Likely to Alter Tax Revision Plans, WALL ST. J., May 24,
1939, at 1 ("fIt was revealed in Senatorial quarters that pressure was being brought to bear
on the House ways and means committee to speed up consideration of the tax agenda in the
belief that further delay might prove disastrous.").
527. 1939 House Hearings, supra note 516, at 249 (statement of Rep. Doughton); id. at 146
(colloquy between Chairman Doughton and Noel Sargent). In hearing that Sargent was going
to discuss, among other things, the "exemption of corporate dividends paid to individuals from
normal income tax since this involves double taxation," Doughton remarked, "I hope you
understood my first informal statement. Those are not corporation taxes ... I hope you will not
discuss income taxes on individuals and excise taxes in this hearing." Id.
528. Id. at 249 (statement of Rep. Jenkins); see Effort Proposed to Broaden Scope of Tax
Hearings, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1939, at 1.
529. 1939 House Hearings, supra note 516, at 249 (statement of Rep. Doughton).
530. Id. at 148-49 (statement of Noel Sargent, National Association of Manufacturers).
531. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
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question.532 Only a last minute amendment by Senator La Follette
on an unrelated matter delayed the bill on the Senate floor, but this
effort was quashed and the bill resumed course. 33 While it is
possible that Congress intended to address the double taxation of
corporate income as part of a planned general study of the corporate
tax structure, 3 ' the issue never garnered the same kind of attention
or interest as did the undistributed profits tax. This may be because
the double tax burden was relatively small compared to the impact
of high individual surtax rates;535 this, however, tells only part of
the story. With the undistributed profits tax out of the way,
corporate managers could avoid or defer the double tax by retaining
earnings and focusing on other measures, such as preferential
capital gains rates, that would provide equal or higher value to
stockholders.
CONCLUSION
The rise of double taxation is a story about one interest group's
purchase of legislation at the potential expense of a diffuse larger
group. Business leaders believed the undistributed profits tax
would infringe upon their ability to run a corporation free from
governmental intrusion. Congressional allies sought to eliminate
that component of the tax, and thus allay the fears of corporate
managers, by subjecting dividends to the individual normal tax and
setting the undistributed profits tax at an equivalent or slightly
higher rate. The cost was the retention of a corporate income tax,
but this was a cost business was willing to incur. In effect, managers
traded double taxation for control over the use of corporate profits.
532. See Turner Catledge, Rushing Tax Bill to Senate Floor, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1939, at
5; Tax Bill Passed in House; Ends Profits Levy, Extends 'Nuisance" Imposts 2 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1939, at 1.
533. Bill to Ease Taxes Passed By Senate, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1939, at 1 (describing
Senator La Follette's amendment to increase surtax rates on incomes between $6,000 and
$100,000).
534. See Congress Leaders Plan to Expedite TaxAid Legislation, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1939,
at 8 ("The staff of the joint congressional committee on internal revenue taxation is analyzing
many suggestions which have been advanced concerning changes in the corporation income
tax structure.").
535. See Kwall, supra note 3, at 621 n.39 (table setting forth the effective tax rates on
corporate income distributed as a dividend).
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This story comports with modern efforts to explain why double
taxation persists.536 According to several studies, most notably one
by Professors Jennifer Arlen and Deborah Weiss, managers actively
lobby for incentives for new investment, such as investment tax
credits and accelerated depreciation, or for tax cuts targeted to a
specific business or industry.537 By contrast, managers are either
opposed to, or are less likely to actively lobby for, windfalls for
existing equity such as rate cuts, or, to a certain extent, integration
of the corporate and shareholder taxes.538 In the former case, the tax
incentives help to stimulate new investment, which satisfies a
manager's desire both to diversify the corporation's investments,
and thus safeguard her undiversified investment in the company,
and to secure and enhance her position with the company."3 9 In the
latter case, however, the windfalls do little to improve the manager
or her investment in the corporation. Moreover, depending upon the
relative marginal rates, integration would threaten the "retained
earnings trap," or double taxation's tendency to trap earnings
within the corporation, by increasing shareholder pressure to
distribute dividends.5" While the current differential between the
highest individual marginal rate (39.6%) and the highest corporate
rate (35%) may be too small to induce shareholders to leave
earnings inside the corporation,541 business tax preferences often
help reduce the top corporate rate for individual corporations.5 2
Furthermore, from 1939 to 1986, the differentials were much
greater.4 Because of the uneven distribution of corporate tax
536. See supra note 24 (collecting sources exploring the persistence of double taxation).
537. RONALD F. KING, MONEY, TE & POLITICS: INvESMENTTAx SUBS DIES AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 285-86 (1993); Arlen & Weiss, supra note 24, at 341-42.
538. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 24, at 338-41.
539. Id. at 334-36.
540. See, e.g., id. at 348, 356; AMERICAN LAW INSTITTE, supra note 4, at 28-33, 39; Eric
Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Disequilibrium, 66 N.C.
L. REv. 839, 843-44 (1988).
541. Compare I.R.C. §§ 1(a) (highest marginal rate for individuals is 39.6%) and 11(b)
(highest marginal rate for corporations is 35%). Under the Economic Growth and
Reconciliation Act of 2001, the retained earnings incentive will disappear completely by 2005
and will actually reverse by 2006 when the highest marginal individual rate is reduced to
33%. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836 at 4, tbl. 3
(May 21, 2001).
542. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 24, at 357.
543. Id. at 356-57.
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preferences, even after the broadening of the base and the reduction
in rates in 1986, the retained earnings trap remained for many
corporations.' Thus, it is not surprising that managers have not
been very inclined to actively lobby for the passage of one of the
many integration proposals that have arisen over the years. 5 5
The distinction between double taxation's rise and its per-
sistence is the role of managers. As the history surrounding the rise
of double taxation demonstrates, corporate managers actively
supported double taxation only in the context of a direct challenge
to their ability to retain earnings. While some may oppose
integration today, most managers publicly support it even while
actively pursuing other goals.' The implication is that corporate
managers are likely to actively lobby for integration only when
repealing double taxation is a potential solution to a direct
challenge to their interests. Just as corporate managers played a
significant role in the rise of double taxation, so too must they play
a role in its fall for integration efforts to succeed.
544. Id. at 358.
545. Id. at 348. Over the years, at least five integration methods have received serious
consideration: (1) the shareholder allocation method in which each shareholder is allocated
his or her pro rata share of the corporation's tax items for the year; (2) the shareholder
imputation credit which involves giving shareholders a credit for taxes paid by the
corporation; (3) the dividend deduction method which involves giving the corporation a
deduction for dividends paid; (4) the dividend exclusion method in which shareholders are
entitled to exclude dividends from income; and (5) the partial or complete mark-to-market
method in which all shareholders, or shareholders only in public corporations, are taxed on
the annual rise in value of their stock and the corporate tax is eliminated entirely or limited
to public corporations. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 3-4; Graetz & Warren,
supra note 1, at 1769.
546. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 24, at 368.
